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VALUATION FREEZES AFTER THE 1988 ACT: THE
IMPACT OF SECTION 2036(c) ON CLOSELY HELD
BUSINESSES
KAREN C. BURKE*
I know what an Act to make things simpler means. It means
that the people who drew it up don't understand it themselves
and that every one of its clauses needs a law-suit to disentan-
gle it.1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the federal taxes on wealth transfers have be-
come widely viewed as essentially "voluntary."2 Criticism of ex-
isting law has focused on the imperfect unification of the gift and
estate taxes, the relatively small amount of revenue generated, and
the ability of taxpayers to transfer wealth from one generation to
another outside the transfer tax system.3 Commentators have paid
particular attention to "estate freeze" techniques in the context of
closely held family businesses.4 In a typical corporate or partner-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., Smith College, 1972; M.A.,
1975, Ph.D. (History), 1979, Harvard University; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1982; LL.M.
(Taxation), Boston University, 1985. The author would like to thank Harry L. Gutman at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School and colleagues at the University of Minnesota
Law School for helpful comments on-an earlier draft.
1. D. SAYERS, UNNATURAL DEATH 163 (London 1969).
2. See Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977).
3. See generally Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines,
43 TAX L. REV. 241 (1988); Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
259 (1983); Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes after ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV.
1183 (1983); Stephan, A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform, 72 VA. L. REV. 1471 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Abbin, Taking the Temperature of Asset Value Freeze Approaches: What's
Hot, What's Not, 66 TAXEs 3 (1988) [hereinafter Abbin, Taking the Temperature]; Abbin,
Is Bifurcation a Dirty Word? The IRS Seems to be Legislating Out Asset Valuation
Freezes Based on Emotional, Not Legal, Rationale, 29 TAX NOTES 297 (1985); Abbin &
Zukin, Have They Nuked the Freeze? Evaluating the Impact of Recent Decisions, Regula-
tions and Rulings, 19 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 500 (1985); Nelson & Genz, New Uncertainties
in the Equity Freeze: The Impact of Dickman on Capital Call Rights and Other Issues, 63
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ship freeze, an older generation transferor shifts the future equity
growth in a business to younger generation family members while
retaining a preferred income interest and control rights.' In terms
of planning, the goal is to minimize both the value of the trans-
ferred equity interest for gift tax purposes and the value of the
retained interest for estate tax purposes. Apart from the gift and
estate tax advantages, an estate freeze may also serve the purpose
of transferring control of a closely held business to the younger
generation while preserving the older generation's interest in the
business.
In order to control estate freeze abuses and prevent further ero-
sion of the transfer tax base, Congress added section 2036(c) to the
Internal Revenue Code in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987 (1987 Act).' In substance, if a transferor makes a lifetime
transfer of property representing a disproportionate share of the
potential appreciation in an enterprise while retaining an income
interest in the enterprise, section 2036(c) draws the value of the
transferred property back into the transferor's gross estate at
death on the theory that the retained interest represents "enjoy-
ment of the transferred property."'7 Although the examples in the
TAXES 999 (1985); The Estate Freezing Rage: A Practical Look at Planning Opportunities
and Potential Problems, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 21 (1980) [hereinafter The Estate
Freezing Rage].
5. For a detailed discussion of the income and transfer tax aspects of corporate and part-
nership freezes, see, e.g., Elias, The Partnership Capital Freeze: A Path Through the Maze,
40 TAX LAW. 45 (1986); Kalb & Massey, Estate Freezing Techniques Through Preferred
Partnerships; Today's Problems, 41 INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch. 44 (1983); Nelson, The Partner-
ship Capital Freeze: Income, Estate, & Gift Tax Considerations, 1 VA. TAX REv. 11 (1981);
Nelson & Woodward, Structuring Estate Freezes: Estate and Gift Tax Aspects, 33 MAJOR
TAX PLAN. ch. 13 (1981); Wallace, Recapitalizing the Closely Held Corporation: New
Problems for an Old Technique, 19 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 400 (1985).
6. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, § 10402(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-431 [hereinafter 1987 Act] and amended by
the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3031, 102
Stat. 3342, 3634 [hereinafter 1988 Act]). Unless otherwise indicated, all Internal Revenue
Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through October
1989.
7. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1). For commentary on § 2036(c) as originally enacted in the 1987 Act,
see, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), PRAC. DRAFT, Apr. 1988, at 1415; Foster &
Rabun, Planning Strategies to Cope with the Limits Imposed on Estate Freezes by RA '87,
15 EST. PLAN. 130 (1988); Magner & Tencza, The Freeze Gets Iced: Section 2036 After
OBRA, 39 TAX NOTES 505 (1988); Schlenger & Canning, New Section 2036(c): A Critical
View, 13 TAX MGMT. EST., GIFTs & TR. J. 115 (1988); see also Dodge, supra note 3, at 361-
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legislative history focus on corporate and partnership freezes, Con-
gress drafted the statute as broadly as possible to reach a wide
range of transactions." The operative provisions include many un-
defined or ambiguous terms that have no commonly understood
meaning for federal tax purposes. In the Technical and Miscellane-
ous Revenue Act of 1988 (1988 Act), Congress substantially revised
and expanded section 2036(c) without curing its vagueness or
ambiguity.'
In view of the potentially broad reach of section 2036(c) and the
uncertainty surrounding its mechanical operation, the statute has
been criticized as an impediment to legitimate family transac-
tions.'0 In addition, section 2036(c) raises significant policy ques-
tions concerning the tax treatment of retained interests in general
66; Lane, Intra-Family Sales: Toward a Uniform Tax Treatment, 41 TAX LAW. 279, 324-27
(1988).
8. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 996, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1245, 2313-1742 [hereinafter 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT]; H.R.
REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1041, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2313-1, 2313-657 [hereinafter 1987 HOUSE REPORT].
9. See 1988 Act, § 3031, 102 Stat. at 3634; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
71, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5048 [hereinafter 1988 CONFERENCE
REPORT]; HR. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 HOUSE RE-
PORT]; S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 522, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4517 [hereinafter 1988 SENATE REPORT]. For commentary on § 2036(c) as re-
vised by the 1988 Act, see Aucutt, Boreas v. Vulcan: The Estate Freeze Meets a Flame-
Throwing Statute, 47 INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch. 23 (1989); Blattmachr & Gans, An Analysis of
the TAMRA Changes to the Valuation Freeze Rules (pts. 1 & 2), 70 J. TAX'N 14, 74 (1989);
Bogdanski & Brown, Farewell to 'Freezes: Section 2036(c), 42 TAX NoTES 1633 (1989);
Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning and Installment Sales, Buy-
Sell Options, Employment Contracts and Leases, 66 TAXES 876 (1988); Keydel, The 1988
Version of Section 2036(c): "Anti-Freeze" Fantasy Overwhelms the Estate Tax, 14 TAX
MGMT. EST., GiFTs & TR. J. 3 (1989); Miller, Gift (W)rapping the Estate Freeze, 41 TAX
NoTEs 1335 (1988).
10. The estate planning bar has sharply criticized § 2036(c). See Letter from Charles W.
Hall, Chair, ABA Section on Taxation to David H. Brockway, Chief of Staff, Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation (Nov. 19, 1987) (copy on file with author) (commenting on estate and gift
tax revenue increases); Technical Corrections Act of 1988: Hearing Before the Senate Fi-
nance Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1988) (statement of Malcolm A. Moore, President
of the American College of Probate Counsel) [hereinafter Moore Statement]; Report to the
House of Delegates: Recommendation 107A, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. (urg-
ing repeal of § 2036(c) as "vague, overbroad and ambiguous") [hereinafter ABA RECOMMEN-
DATION]. For an alternative proposal to § 2036(c), see Task Force of the ABA Section of Real
Property Probate and Trust Law, ABA Section of Taxation & The American College of
Probate Counsel, Report of the Section 2036(c) Task Force (contained in Letter from Irwin
L. Treiger, L. Henry Gissel, Jr., and Geraldine S. Hemmerling of the Task Force to Ronald
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and the appropriateness of applying the reinclusion approach of
section 2036(c) to the valuation problems posed by estate freezes.
In its long-awaited guidance on section 2036(c), released in Sep-
tember of 1989, the Service failed to resolve some of the most
pressing questions relating to the operation of the statute." Pend-
ing further interpretive guidance, continuing legislative attempts
to clarify and refine the existing statute are likely.
This Article examines the scope and effect of section 2036(c),
and seeks to define a framework for implementing its underlying
policy objectives. Part I presents a historical overview of estate
freezes and explores alternative approaches to valuation problems
under prior law. Parts II and III analyze the scope of section
2036(c) and identify the need for technical refinements to clarify
the existing statute. Part IV goes beyond the technical problems
and proposes a transfer tax model derived from the income tax
rules for family partnerships. 2 The model reallocates dispropor-
tionate shifts in value attributable to inadequate returns on in-
vested capital and correlates the estate tax reinclusion rules of sec-
tion 2036(c) to the reallocated value. In the transfer tax context of
section 2036(c), these rules should make it possible to define the
appropriate treatment of estate freeze transactions so that only the
disproportionate shift in value is drawn back into the transfer tax
base.
I. VALUATION FREEZES PRIOR TO SECTION 2036(c)
A. Structuring a Freeze
In its simplest form, an estate freeze involves the transfer of an
interest representing future appreciation by an older generation
transferor, coupled with the retention of another interest having a
fixed value. Assume, for example, that A owns all of the common
A. Pearlman, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation (July 27, 1989) (copy on file with
author)).
11. See I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-38 I.R.B. 4. For prior informal announcements by gov-
ernment spokespersons, see Louden, Forthcoming Estate Freeze Guidance Explained, 42
TAX NOTES 1297 (1989); Matthews, Conference Covers the Waterfront on 1989 Tax Issues,
42 TAX NOTES 1540 (1989); Section 2036(c) Estate Freeze Guidance is Imminent, IRS Offi-
cial Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at G-4 (Feb. 15, 1989).
12. See I.R.C. § 704(e); see also infra notes 327-33 and accompanying text.
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stock of a company worth $1,000,000 and wishes to transfer the
potential appreciation to B, a younger generation family member.
A causes the company to issue preferred stock and common stock
in exchange for A's voting common stock in a tax-free recapitaliza-
tion. A retains the preferred stock and gives the common stock to
B.13 If the retained stock is worth $990,000, the transferred stock
will be valued at $10,000 for gift tax purposes.14 The intended re-
sult of the transaction is that the value of A's preferred stock will
be "frozen" at $990,000 and subsequent appreciation in the com-
pany, reflected in the common stock, will not be included in A's
gross estate for estate tax purposes. Thus, under pre-1987 law, if
the freeze were properly structured and the company were worth
$4,000,000 at A's death, the preferred stock ($990,000) would be
included in A's gross estate, but the interim appreciation in the
value of the common stock ($3,000,000) would not be taxed.
In theory, the estate freeze described above is not inherently
abusive. If the respective values assigned to the preferred and com-
mon stock are properly determined, transfer taxes are not avoided
because the gift tax is imposed on the value of the transferred
property at the time of the transfer ($10,000) and the estate tax is
imposed on the value of the preferred stock in A's estate. The full
$3,000,000 of appreciation could just as easily have been removed
from A's gross estate if A had given away the entire $1,000,000 of
stock and retained no preferred stock. By retaining the preferred
stock, however, A may in effect be retaining a degree of control
over the value of the transferred property subsequent to the initial
gift.
13. The same result could be accomplished by a tax-free dividend of preferred stock on
A's common stock, followed by a transfer of the common stock to B. Alternatively, if B
already owns common stock, the recapitalization could be accomplished by a tax-free con-
version of A's common stock into preferred stock. See Wallace, supra note 5, 1 400, at 4-3.
14. The recapitalization will not result in a gift if the value of the common and preferred
stock received in the exchange is at least equal to the value of the common stock surren-
dered. An inadvertent gift may occur, however, if the recapitalization involves an exchange
of unequal value. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (transaction may be recast "in accor-
dance with its true nature"); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (gift to corporation is a gift to
shareholders).
1989]
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B. Valuation
The potential abuse in the above example arises from undervalu-
ation of the common stock for gift tax purposes and possibly from
undervaluation of the preferred stock for estate tax purposes. 15 It
is unlikely that any operating company's assets and earnings could
support a valuation of conventional preferred stock equal to 99%
of the company's total value.' 6 If the preferred stock is entitled to
a fixed rate of dividends and liquidation preference, the common
stock generally has substantial value because of its exclusive right
to future appreciation." To support a high value for the preferred
stock and a correspondingly low value for the common stock at the
time of the initial gift, the preferred stock might be issued with
special features such as high noncumulative dividends, constant
value conversion rights, and limited participation in liquidation
proceeds exceeding a fixed liquidation preference.' 8 At least in the-
ory, retained voting rights would represent the right to require the
company to pay fair dividends.' 9 Similarly, a constant value con-
version feature would in theory compensate for an inadequate
yield because the preferred stock would presumably be worth no
less to a willing buyer than the underlying common stock.2 ° Such
special features are intended to absorb nearly the entire value of
15. Such a situation would occur, for example, if the value of the preferred stock is dis-
counted for voting or other rights that lapse at death. See infra notes 63-76 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See, e.g., Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1000; Wallace, supra note 5, 1 403.5, at 4-
35; see also Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170, amplifying Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237
(most important factors in valuing preferred stock are yield, dividend coverage, and protec-
tion of liquidation premium). But see Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M.
(CCH) 553 (1988) (criticizing the valuation approach of Rev. Rul. 83-120).
17. See Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170 (equity's right to appreciation has substantial
value).
18. See, e.g., Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1000-01; Wallace, supra note 5, 403.5, at
4-33 to 4-41.
19. The importance of voting rights in valuing preferred stock is well illustrated by case
law. See, e.g., Estate of Salisbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441, 1452 (1975)
(38.1% control premium for voting preferred stock); cf. Behrend v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (P-H) T 61,604 (1961) (60% discount for nonvoting preferred stock).
20. A constant value conversion feature would permit conversion of the preferred stock
into common stock having a value, at the time of the conversion, equal to the par or stated
value of the preferred. See Wallace, supra note 5, 403.5, at 4-38 to 4-39. The value of the
conversion feature might be discounted, however, to reflect the improbability of conversion.
See Estate of Wallace v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 904, 915-17 (D. Mass. 1981).
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the company and to compensate for an inadequate yield on the
preferred stock. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, high inter-
est rates and inflation gave rise to various innovative devices to
augment the value of investments having below-market yields.
As a practical matter, preferred stock generally cannot be struc-
tured to absorb the entire value of a corporation if other classes of
stock are outstanding. 1 Moreover, giving the preferred stock
meaningful rights to participate in future income and appreciation
is impossible without defeating the estate planning value of the
transaction.2 The high value assigned to preferred stock having
special features is realistic only if unrelated parties who pursue
their respective economic interests hold the common and preferred
stock. In a typical estate freeze, however, the common stock is
designed to have economic value in the hands of related family
members far exceeding its hypothetical value in the hands of
strangers.2"
Courts have generally adopted a valuation approacbi based on a
hypothetical transaction between a "willing buyer" and a "willing
seller. 12 4 The weight of authority suggests that the courts may dis-
regard the family relationship between the parties to the actual
transaction in valuing the transferred property because the parties
to the hypothetical transaction are conclusively presumed to be
unrelated.2 5 This "open market" approach, which is not compelled
by the existing statute or regulations, ignores the economic sub-
21. See Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 877 (1978), nonacq., 1980-2 C.B. 2
(holding that common stock had a value equal to at least 10% of the value of the entire
corporation, even though the preferred stock had a liquidation preference equal to nearly
200% of the corporation's value); see also The Estate Freezing Rage, supra note 4, at 59
(valuation experts unlikely to assign less than 20% of company's value to common stock);
Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1001; Wallace, supra note 5, % 403.5, at 4-40 to 4-41.
22. See Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1001.
23. See Estate of Wallace, 566 F. Supp. at 918 (ignoring the practical value of the com-
mon stock "would create an open door to legitimate estate and gift tax avoidance").
24. See id. (hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller standard should not "insulate from
consideration some characteristics of the property interests that the donor in fact trans-
ferred to the donee"); see also Luce v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 212, 220 (1983) (hypothetical
buyer of a minority interest is not necessarily restricted to the general public, but may in-
clude potential buyers closely connected with the corporation).
25. See, e.g., Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 337 (1989) (rejecting the as-
sumption that the hypothetical purchaser is a related family member).
1989]
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stance of the transaction. 6 Under a more realistic approach, the
value of the preferred stock arguably should be discounted to re-
flect the likelihood that the nonpecuniary rights will not be exer-
cised in a manner that maximizes the yield on the preferred stock.
In light of the family's collective long range estate planning goals,
the holder of the preferred stock probably would exercise such
rights to enhance the value of common stock held by related family
members.
C. Retained Interests
The basic problems raised by fragmentation of property into
transferred interests and retained interests are not new. The Code
has long required that lifetime transfers be drawn back into the
transferor's gross estate at death if the transferor retains beneficial
enjoyment or control of the transferred property until death. The
retained-interest provision, currently codified in section 2036(a),
originally served, prior to enactment of the federal gift tax in 1932,
to prevent the erosion of the estate tax base through lifetime
gifts.2 In the case of a revocable trust or other will substitute in
which the transferor retains sufficient enjoyment or control of the
transferred property, this provision ensures that the property will
be valued ultimately for transfer tax purposes as of the date of
death or the alternate valuation date. Section 2036(a) does not ap-
ply, however, if the transferor receives "adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth" for the initial transfer.29 The
rationale for this exception is presumably that the transferor's
26. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 226; see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (noting that "[a]ll
relevant facts and elements of value as of the time of the gift shall be considered"); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-2 (identifying relevant factors in valuing stock and the weight to be accorded
to such factors).
27. See I.R.C. § 2036(a); see also I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038.
28. The expansive language of present section 2036(a) was intended to reverse the
landmark decision in May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), holding that a reserved life estate
'transfer was not taxable on the death of the transferor because title vested in the transferee
at the time of the transfer. See also the trilogy of cases following May v. Heiner: Burnet v.
Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783
(1931) (per curiam); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) (per curiam). See infra
notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
29. See I.R.C. § 2036(a).
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gross estate will not be diminished if the transferred property is
replaced by other assets of at least equal value.30
The courts interpret section 2036(a) to require that the retained
enjoyment or control relate directly to the transferred property.
Indirect control in the form of retained voting stock does not trig-
ger estate tax inclusion. This narrow reading of section 2036(a)
flows from United States v. Byrum,s1 ih which the Supreme Court
held that retained voting rights with respect to transferred stock
did not constitute possession or enjoyment of the stock for pur-
poses of section 2036(a).32 The "considerable breach in the federal
estate tax" opened by that decision prompted Congress to enact
section 2036(b),"3 which requires the value of transferred stock in a
controlled corporation to be drawn back into the transferor's gross
estate if the transferor retains the right to vote the transferred
shares.3 4 As the legislative history makes clear, however, section
2036(b) applies only to retention of voting rights in the transferred
stock, not to retention of voting stock that indirectly controls the
value of the transferred stock.3 5 Thus, neither section 2036(a) nor
section 2036(b) prevents the older generation from retaining voting
control in the form of voting preferred stock while transferring eq-
30. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 279. See generally Lowndes, Consideration and the Fed-
eral Estate and Gift Taxes: Transfers for Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Mari-
tal Rights, Family Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 50 (1966).
31. 408 U.S. 125 (1972). See generally Pedrick, Grantor Powers and the Estate Tax: End
of an Era?, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 704 (1977) (criticizing Byrum).
32. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 150. The government also contended that the decedent continued
to control corporate dividend policy and thus possessed the power to shift or defer beneficial
enjoyment of income on the transferred stock. The Court rejected the government's argu-
ments based largely on the economic and legal constraints that exist on a controlling share-
holder's powers. Id. at 144.
33. Pedrick, supra note 31, at 712, 717; see Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
2009(a), (e)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893, 1896 (1976) (amending § 2036(a)(1)); see also H.R. REP.
No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3356,
3419 (1976). The Revenue Act of 1978 added the parenthetical phrase "directly or indi-
rectly" that appears in present § 2036(b)(1). Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §
702(i), 92 Stat. 2763, 2931 (1978) (adding § 2036(b) and amending § 2036(a)).
34. See I.R.C. § 2036(b).
35. See S. REP. No. 745, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1978); see also Rev. Rul. 81-15, 1981-1
C.B. 457; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-2(a), 48 Fed. Reg. 35,143 (1983) (inclusion not re-
quired under § 2036(b) unless donor has retained voting rights in the transferred stock).
The proposed regulations interpret the "direct or indirect" language more broadly than sug-
gested by the legislative history. See id. § 20.2036-2(e), -2(e)(4), ex. (3).
19891
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uity growth to the younger generation in the form of nonvoting
common stock. 6
Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner37 reaffirmed the limited scope
of section 2036(a). In Boykin, the transferor transferred voting
common stock to a family trust and retained only nonvoting pre-
ferred stock until his death. The preferred stock was entitled to a
ten-to-one dividend preference as well as a substantial liquidation
preference.3 The common stock was not entitled to any dividend
unless the corporation's board of directors certified that the corpo-
ration's net worth was sufficient to pay all dividends and satisfy
the liquidation preference of the preferred stock. 9 The govern-
ment analyzed the Boykin transaction as a bifurcation of the
transferor's original proportionate interest into two separate prop-
erty rights: (i) voting common stock representing the right to fu-
ture growth, and (ii) nonvoting preferred stock representing nearly
all of the dividends that the corporation would ever pay.40
The Tax Court rejected the government's argument that the pre-
ferred stock's "disproportionate" right to share in future dividends
meant that the preferred stockholders had retained "nearly all of
the income" from-and thus the enjoyment of-the voting com-
mon stock transferred to the family trusts.41 It held that the only
retained rights were those accorded to the preferred stock, which
were "separate and distinct rights from the rights enjoyed by the
[transferred] voting shares."4 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Tax
36. See Pedrick, supra note 31, at 718; see also Chambers v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 225
(1986) (gift not rendered incomplete because of transferors' retained right to vote stock in
fiduciary capacity).
37. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
38. Id. at 346.
39. Id. The preferred stock was callable at $100 per share by majority vote of the corpora-
tion's board of directors. Id.
40. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-04-011 (Oct. 1, 1984).
41. Estate of Boykin, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 347-48.
42. Id. at 348. The court distinguished two earlier cases advanced to support the govern-
ment's argument that the decedent had retained an interest in the transferred stock. See
Estate of Cooper v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1373 (1980) (retained-interest coupons from
bearer bonds transferred to trust for grandchildren); Overton v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 304
(1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947) (creation of two classes of stock was a mere device
to shift income between related parties); see also Chambers v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 225,
234-36 (1986) (rejecting the government's argument that amounts designated as dividends
on nonvoting common stock were in fact attributable to voting common stock).
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Court noted that shareholders generally have no legal right to a
share of corporate earnings or assets until declaration of a dividend
or dissolution of the corporation. 43 It also indicated that the fiduci-
ary duties of the preferred stockholders as trustees of the family
trusts and as directors of the corporation limited their ability to
pay an unreasonable dividend to themselves." In a footnote, the
Tax Court indicated that the real issue was not whether the com-
mon stock should be included in the decedent's gross estate under
section 2036(a), but rather how the preferred stock, concededly in-
cludible under section 2033, should be valued.45 The government's
argument that creation of the preferred stock in effect stripped the
common stock of much of its value might indicate that the value of
the preferred shares accounted for the "bulk of the value of [the
corporation's] equity. 46
The underlying problem in Boykin was the understatement of
the value of the voting common stock (and the corresponding over-
statement of the value of the nonvoting preferred stock) at the
time of the initial recapitalization. The liquidation value of the
preferred stock was capped at $15,000,000, even though the net
worth of the company was only approximately $4,000,000 when the
recapitalization occurred in 1969. 47 According to the company's
board of directors, the net asset value of the company did not
reach $15,000,000 until 1978, after the company successfully rene-
gotiated an important timber contract.48 The high liquidation pre-
mium and ten-to-one dividend preference were intended to offset a
discount in the value of the preferred stock because it lacked cu-
mulative dividend rights. Indeed, the shareholders rejected an ear-
lier recapitalization plan providing for a fixed dividend preference
because the company would have lacked the cash to pay market
rate cumulative dividends. 49 Despite the open ended nature of the
43. Estate of Boykin, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 348.
44. Id. at 349.
45. Id. at n.7.
46. Id. The court suggested that parties resolve valuation disputes by settlement because
"[litigation is an inefficient, wasteful, and inherently imprecise method of resolving valua-
tion disputes." Id.
47. See Reply Brief for Respondent at 7, Estate of Boykin (No. 38554-84).
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Estate of Boykin (No. 38554-84).
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preferred stockholders' formal dividend rights, the minimal divi-
dends that the company actually paid indicated that the company
never intended to pay a market rate of return on the preferred
stock." The recapitalization in Boykin thus allowed the transferor
to dispose of the potential growth of the common stock at a negli-
gible gift tax cost while retaining control over the dividends actu-
ally paid on the preferred stock.51
D. Periodic Gifts
In addition to the estate tax issues raised by retained control
over transferred property, a gift tax problem exists relating to the
ongoing, periodic transfer of value made possible by the trans-
feror's retained control. In Dickman v. Commissioner,12 the Su-
preme Court held that an interest-free demand loan gave rise to
periodic deemed gifts, on the theory that the gift tax encompasses
"all transfers of property and property rights having significant
value."53 Under a narrow reading of Dickman, deemed gift treat-
ment may be limited to situations in which the measure of the gift
can be determined by reference to an objective external standard. 4
An expansive reading of Dickman, however, raises the possibility
that preferred stockholders' periodic waiver of dividend rights, or
failure to exercise conversion rights, may result in deemed gifts to
common stockholders. 55
When a controlling shareholder periodically waives the right to
receive annual noncumulative dividends on preferred stock, the
waiver increases indirectly the value of the common stock held by
other shareholders. The Internal Revenue Service has held that a
50. See id. at 85; Estate of Boykin, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 347.
51. The common stock was apparently reported for gift tax purposes as representing an
equity investment of only $40,000 in 1969. The government did not challenge the value
reported on the gift tax return. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Estate of Boykin
(No. 38554-84).
52. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
53. Id. at 334. In response to Dickman, Congress enacted a specific statutory provision
dealing with below-market loans. See I.R.C. § 7872.
54. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 344 n.14 ("[T]o support a gift tax ... it is sufficient ... to
establish that a certain yield could readily be secured and that the reasonable value of the
use of the funds can be reliably ascertained."); see id. at 350 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting
uncertainty that majority opinion would create in other situations).
55. See Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1005-10.
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shareholder who forgoes an economic opportunity to receive an ad-
equate yield on preferred stock in a closely held business makes a
taxable gift to the extent of the forgone dividend.5 6 Under the Ser-
vice's view, even bona fide business reasons for such nonpayment
of a noncumulative dividend are ineffective to prevent deemed gift
treatment if the company could adequately protect the preferred
stockholder's rights by other means, such as declaring an unpaid
dividend or issuing a corporate note in lieu of an actual cash pay-
ment.57 Unless a waiver primarily benefits related family members,
however, it does not result in a taxable gift if prompted by valid
business considerations. 8
The Service also has held that a preferred stockholder's periodic
failure to exercise conversion rights operates to divert corporate
earnings to common stockholders and triggers annual taxable
gifts. 5 By failing to protect his right to an adequate share of cor-
porate earnings, the preferred stockholder increases indirectly the
value of the transferred common stock. By analogy to Dickman,
the Service indicated that (i) the increase in the value of the com-
mon stock was a legally recognized interest, (ii) the transfer was
gratuitous, and (iii) the transfer represented a significant sum. In
addition, the Service noted that the preferred stockholder failed to
receive the high yield typically associated with preferred stock.
The economic distinctions between a conversion right and a be-
low-market loan, however, make it difficult to determine whether
failure to exercise a conversion right gives rise to a taxable gift
and, if so, the timing and value of such a gift. 0 By analogy to a
below-market lender, the preferred stockholder arguably makes his
capital available for the benefit of the common stockholders for
less than full and adequate consideration. By contrast, the pre-
ferred stockholder cannot exercise the conversion right without
some loss of security and liquidity. The additional risk associated
56. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-23-007 (Feb. 18, 1987) (taxable gifts to trusts for the benefit of
waiving shareholder's grandchildren).
57. Id.
58. See Rev. Rul. 67-14, 1967-1 C.B. 591; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-31-063 (May 11, 1989)
(related parties must not receive more than 20% of total dividends distributed to nonwaiv-
ing shareholders).
59. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-26-005 (Mar. 13, 1987).
60. See Nelson & Genz, supra note 4, at 1006.
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with common stock would presumably deter some preferred stock-
holders from exercising conversion rights."' The administrative dif-
ficulty of determining the timing and value of a deemed gift may
be sufficient to prevent application of Dickman-type principles to
the nonexercise of conversion rights.2
E. Disappearing Value
Another problem raised by estate freezes involves the valuation
of retained nonpecuniary rights that lapse at death. Such rights
may be used to support a high value for property interests retained
by the transferor (and a correspondingly low value for the trans-
ferred property) for gift tax purposes at the time of the lifetime
transfer. When the rights lapse upon the transferor's death, how-
ever, the government is likely to face the argument that it should
disregard the lapsed rights when valuing the retained interest for
estate tax purposes. The government has sought to prevent the
"disappearing value" from escaping transfer tax entirely. Case law
has not reached a consensus concerning the appropriate standard
for valuing property interests that are affected by the act of trans-
fer or the holder's death. It is unclear whether the transfer tax
base is to be determined by reference to (i) the value of the inter-
est in the hands of the transferor immediately before the transfer,
(ii) the value of the interest in the hands of the transferee immedi-
ately after the transfer, or (iii) the greater or lesser of the first two
alternatives.6 4
Relying on cases such as United States v. Land,6 5 the govern-
ment has argued that the value attributable to lapsed voting rights
should be includible in the decedent's gross estate because the re-
tention of voting rights until the moment of death constitutes a
61. Id. at 1006-07.
62. See Estate of Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. No. 43 (1989) (failure to exercise con-
version rights resulted in periodic constructive gifts; amount determined by reference to
increase in net worth rather than imputed interest under Dickman).
63. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 253.
64. Id.
65. 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962). In an often cited but enig-
matic passage, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[b]rief as is the instant of death, the court must
pinpoint its valuation at this instant." Id. at 172. The court went on to observe that "valua-
tion is determined by the interest that passes, and the value of the interest before or after
death is pertinent only as it serves to indicate the value at death." Id.
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"passive transfer" to the remaining shareholders.6 If the passive
transfer theory prevails in litigation, it may have quite different
implications depending on whether the premise for estate tax in-
clusion is section 2033 or the retention provisions of section 2036.
Under section 2033, the amount includible in the gross estate
would be limited to the value of the preferred stock owned at the
time of death, valued as a voting interest. If section 2036 applies,
the post-transfer appreciation in the value of the transferred com-
mon stock would be drawn back into the decedent's gross estate as
well. On its facts, at least one case has raised, but not resolved, the
issue of whether disappearing voting rights should give rise to
value includible in the gross estate under sections 2033 or 2036.7
Recently, the Service held that a taxable gift occurred in a re-
capitalization when a controlling shareholder exchanged his voting
common stock for a new class of common stock with voting rights
that would terminate at his death."8 The Service viewed the recapi-
talization as shifting part of the value of the controlling share-
holder's stock to the remaining outstanding stock held by a genera-
tion-skipping trust.69 This view seems inconsistent with the
Service's earlier position that the value attributable to lifetime vot-
ing rights should be included in the decedent's gross estate.70 Pre-
sumably, if the shift in value attributable to the lifetime voting
rights is measured and taxed as a completed gift at the time of the
recapitalization, those voting rights should be disregarded in valu-
ing the shareholder's stock for estate tax purposes. The gift tax
payable on a deemed lifetime transfer may be significantly less
66. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-01-006 (Sept. 28, 1983) (value attributable to expiring voting
rights of preferred stock includible under § 2033; alternative holding that value of the trans-
ferred stock includible under § 2036(a)); see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,140 (Sept. 6, 1983) (rec-
ommending a published ruling indicating that § 2036(b) requires inclusion of voting rights
that lapse at death in the transferor's gross estate).
67. Benz v. Commissioner, [1985 Transfer Binder] Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) No. 33586-85; see
Abbin, Taking the Temperature, supra note 4, at 7; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-10-011
(Nov. 15, 1985) and Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-10-002 (Nov. 26, 1984) (discussing issues raised in
Benz).
68. Rev. Rul. 89-3, 1989-2 I.R.B. 5; see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,784 (Mar. 1, 1989).
69. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,784 (Mar. 1, 1989); see I.R.C. § 2601 (imposing generation-skip-
ping tax). The transfer did not trigger any immediate generation-skipping transfer tax con-
sequences because a nonskip person (the controlling shareholder's son) owned an income
interest in the trust. See I.R.C. §§ 2613, 2652(c).
70. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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than the estate tax that would be payable if the value of the stock
at death included the value of the voting rights.
The problem of disappearing value attributable to voting rights
also arises when a controlling shareholder fragments his controlling
block of shares into several minority blocks and transfers the less
valuable minority blocks to various family members. If the minor-
ity blocks are not viewed as related portions of a controlling block,
the control premium attributable to the family's aggregate stock
holdings may escape transfer tax altogether. Recognizing this pos-
sibility, the Service has held that a control premium may be attrib-
uted to shares of a closely held family corporation when an indi-
vidual family member owns more than 50% of the voting stock.71
Several cases cited by the Service illustrate the potential abuses
arising from the ability to fragment a single valuable property in-
terest into several less valuable parts that may be transferred at
various times, at minimal transfer tax cost, and subsequently
recombined into their more valuable configurations.72 According to
the Service, these cases "require a transferor's gift to be measured
by the value of property relinquished by the donor rather than the
value of the property acquired by the donee. '' 71 Because the donor
originally owned a controlling interest, the gift tax would be im-
posed upon the value of the stock as a controlling interest in the
donor's hands rather than upon its value as a minority interest in
the donee's hands.7 4
If the transfer tax is defined by reference to the diminution in
the transferor's wealth caused by a transfer, the value of the prop-
erty in the transferor's hands is generally a better measure than
71. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-07-002 (Nov. 1, 1988) (redemption triggered gift of "corporate
equity" to remaining shareholders); see Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187 (simultaneous
transfer of one-third interests in all of the stock of a closely held corporation to three chil-
dren; children could exercise control over the corporation only by acting jointly).
72. See, e.g., Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1988);
Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1983); Ahmanson Found. v. United
States, 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Estate of Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577
(1987).
73. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-07-002 (Nov. 1, 1988).
74. The Service indicated that although Rev. Rul. 81-253 reaches the correct result, it
rests on the faulty assumption that the value for gift tax purposes of a minority interest in
family held stock is the fair market value of the stock in the hands of the donee. Id.
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the value in the transferee's hands.75 Alternatively, a transfer tax
base defined by reference to the greater of the value of the prop-
erty in the hands of either the transferor or the transferee may be
justified by revenue considerations as well as the need to prevent
artificially low valuations of property interests transferred during
life or at death. The problem of disappearing value is analytically
distinguishable from changes that affect the total value of property
in the hands of both the transferor and the transferee. 1 Valuation
rules that sanction temporary artificial reductions in the value of
assets encourage transactions with no independent economic
benefit.
F. Partnership Freeze
As an estate-freeze vehicle, partnerships offer unrivaled flexibil-
ity at the cost of a corresponding increase in complexity.77 In a
typical partnership freeze, the holder of a "frozen" partnership in-
terest is entitled to receive a fixed annual return and a liquidation
preference equal to the value of his original capital contribution.
The holders of the other interests are entitled to any additional
income as well as any capital appreciation in the contributed prop-
erty.718 In theory, no gift should occur on formation of a partner-
ship as long as the value of the frozen partnership interest is at
least equal to that of the contributed property. Under an entity
view, a partner's retention of an indirect ownership interest in the
partnership assets should not trigger section 2036(a).79 If the initial
contribution of property exchanged for a partnership interest is
treated as a partial gift, however, section 2036(a) may require in-
clusion in the gross estate of the contributed property to the extent
75. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 226-28.
76. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 839 F.2d at 1255 (pre-transfer restrictions intended
merely to depress artificially the value of property transferred to long term family trusts).
But see Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 337 (1989) (transfer restrictions served
valid purpose of keeping company private).
77. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 13 ("Of all the vehicles for avoiding transfer tax on shifts
of future appreciation, the partnership is the most flexible, the most complex, and the least
understood by tax planners and representatives of the fisc.").
78. Id. at 16; see Kalb & Massey, supra note 5, § 44.02, at 44-3 to 44-9.
79. See, e.g., Harmon, Should Partnership Interests Gifted in Multi-Level Freeze Be In-
cluded in the Donor's Gross Estate Under Section 2036?., 64 TAxEs 741, 745 (1986) (entity
versus aggregate approach); see also infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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that its fair market value at the partner's death exceeds the con-
sideration received in the initial exchange.8 0 Although valuation of
partnership freeze interests has received relatively little attention
from the Service and the courts, valuation principles developed in
the analogous context of corporate freezes provide a useful starting
point.81
1. Liquidation Rights
If a general partner's liquidation right disappears at death, it is
unclear whether the full liquidation value of his pro rata share of
partnership property is includible in his gross estate under section
2033.82 In Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner,83 the Tax Court re-
jected the government's contention that the disappearing value at-
tributable to conversion of a general partner's right into a mere
equitable interest at death constituted an indirect transfer includi-
ble in the decedent's gross estate. 4 The case involved a limited
partnership formed by a father and his two sons. In exchange for a
contribution of approximately $59,000,000, the father received a
1% general partnership interest and a 77.8% limited partnership
interest. Each of the two sons contributed approximately
$8,000,000 of property to the partnership in exchange for 10.6%
general partnership interests.8 5 The father, who was seriously ill,
had previously executed a power of attorney authorizing one son to
manage his assets, including the assets transferred to the limited
partnership. 8 The assets held by the partnership consisted primar-
ily of real estate, oil and gas interests, and marketable securities.
Under the partnership agreement, each general partner, but not
the limited partner, had a right during life to dissolve the partner-
80. Uhder certain circumstances, a gift may also trigger application of the family partner-
ship rules of § 704(e). See infra notes 327-33 and accompanying text.
81. See Elias, supra note 5, at 64-65; Nelson, supra note 5, at 46-50.
82. The value of a general partnership interest is seldom less than a pro rata share of the
partnership's assets because a general partner could cause a dissolution or liquidation of the
partnership. See Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 239 (1984). But see Estate of Watts v.
Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing value of limited partnership inter-
est in which liquidation right terminated at death).
83. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987).
84. Id. at 1309.
85. Id. at 1307.
86. Id.
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ship. The partnership was to be dissolved on the death of a general
partner unless all other general partners agreed within ninety days
to continue the partnership. The partnership agreement also gave
the remaining general partners the right to purchase the deceased
partner's general partnership interest. When the father died five
months after the formation of the partnership, the sons exercised
their option to purchase the father's general partnership interest
for approximately $750,000 and agreed to continue the partner-
ship. The sole issue before the court was the estate tax value of
the father's limited partnership interest. The government argued
for a value of approximately $59,000,000, and the estate argued
that the value should be discounted to approximately
$33,000,000.88 The parties stipulated that the nearly $26,000,000
discount was attributable to the father's unexercised right to dis-
solve the partnership prior to his death."
The government contended that the Tax Court should disregard
the dissolution provisions of the partnership agreement as "an at-
tempt to artificially depress the value of decedent's property for
estate tax purposes. ' 9° According to the government, the formation
of the partnership represented a mere fragmentation of the fa-
ther's property rights with no effect on the total value of the prop-
erty transferred to the partnership. 1 As general partners and their
father's successors in interest, the sons possessed the same power
to dissolve the partnership and receive the full liquidation value of
the father's limited partnership interest after his death as the fa-
ther had possessed during life.92
The court concluded, however, that the father's limited partner-
ship interest was correctly valued without regard to his lifetime
right to dissolve the partnership because that right expired at
death. The court indicated that it would ignore the partnership
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1308.
89. Id.
90. Brief for Respondent at 38A, Estate of Harrison (No. 19980-84).
91. Id. (noting that "[t]he decedent's sons will ultimately succeed to the entire interest
which the decedent possessed in the partnership prior to his death").
92. Id. at 38A-38B.
93. Estate of Harrison, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1308-09. The court found that the argument
that "something of value" passed to the sons was inconsistent with the government's stipu-
lation that the value of the sons' interests was the same (i) immediately before the dece-
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agreement "only if there is no business purpose for the creation of
the partnership or if the agreement is merely a substitute for testa-
mentary disposition. 9 4 It found an adequate business purpose for
formation of the partnership because the partnership's purpose
was to manage and conserve the father's assets during his illness.9 5
Because a willing buyer could have purchased only a limited part-
nership interest with no power of dissolution, the court accepted
the taxpayer's valuation of the father's limited partnership inter-
est, in effect allowing a $26,000,000 discount for lack of liquidity
and control.", The court also rejected the government's argument
that the father's initial transfer of property to the partnership was
without adequate consideration, noting that none of the general
partners reserved a power of dissolution exercisable by their re-
spective successors in interest after death."
The court's assumption that the power of dissolution had the
same value in the case of the father's partnership interest as in the
case of the sons' partnership interests is questionable. Because of
the father's advanced age and ill health, the lifetime limitation on
his ability to dissolve the partnership reduced the value of his
partnership interest more than the similar limitation on his sons'
interests. Arguably, the initial formation of the partnership gave
rise to a taxable gift from the father to the sons because of the
disparate effects of the limitations on their respective interests.
2. Capital shift
The partnership freeze may be enhanced through special alloca-
tions of income and deductions to shift both capital and unrealized
appreciation from the frozen partner's interest to the other part-
ners' interests.98 In a partnership capital shift, disproportionate
dent's death, (ii) at the moment of the decedent's death, and (iii) immediately after the




97. Id. Through this argument, the government sought to include the value of the prop-
erty originally transferred to the partnership under the provisions of §§ 2035, 2036, 2038
and 2041.
98. See Kalb & Massey, supra note 5, § 44.02, at 44-9. Such allocations would be subject
to the substantial economic effect test under § 704(b). See I.R.C. § 704(b) and regulations
thereunder; see also Rev. Proc. 88-51, 1988-2 C.B. 711 (revoking the Service's no-ruling pol-
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loss allocations and cash flow distributions in excess of taxable in-
come reduce the frozen partner's capital account balance.99 Con-
versely, the partnership's net taxable income retained in the part-
nership increases the other partners' capital account balances.
Because a partner's capital account balance at the time of liquida-
tion generally equals the amount distributable to him, a portion of
the original equity attributable to the frozen partner's interest in
effect shifts to the other partners. The result of a partnership capi-
tal shift is thus similar to a bargain sale of the frozen partner's
interest to the other partners. 100
Recently, the Service attacked a partnership capital shift on the
grounds that (i) the transferor retained the right to income from
the contributed property, and (ii) the transferor received less than
adequate and full consideration in exchange for his partnership
contribution. 10 A father contributed ranching property with a
stated value of $1,725,000 to a limited partnership in exchange for
a general partnership interest. His two adult children contributed
$5,000 each for limited partnership interests. The father was enti-
tled to a special allocation of partnership income equal to at least
the "net cash receipts attributable to the rental of capital assets,"
as well as any additional net cash receipts, until he recovered his
capital contribution.'0 2 The partnership agreement also allocated
99% of partnership capital losses and 90% of all other losses to the
father. Although the property the father contributed had appreci-
ated to nearly $6,000,000 when the father died, his partnership in-
terest was valued at less than $2,000,000.
The Service held that by reserving the right to rental payments
from the ranching property, the partnership's only capital asset,
the father had retained an income right under section 2036(a).'0 3
icy with respect to special allocations for the purpose of freezing the value of a partner's
partnership interest).
99. A partner's capital account is generally credited with the cash and the fair market
value of property contributed in exchange for a partnership interest. It is increased by addi-
tional capital contributions and the partner's share of partnership income, and decreased by
distributions and the partner's share of partnership losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(b).
100. See Kalb & Massey, supra note 5, § 44.02, at 44-12.
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The Service distinguished Boykin and Harrison on the ground that
a "direct relationship [existed] between the decedent's retained
right to receive the rent and the transferred rental property."10 4
The Service then considered whether the father had received ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth for his
contribution to the partnership. Without making a factual deter-
mination of the fair market value of the father's partnership inter-
est at the time of the original transfer, the Service stated that "a
determination of the rights attributable to the [father's partner-
ship] interest (and whether the rights are reducible to a money
value as consideration in money or money's worth) is a question of
law.o10 5
To determine the nature of the consideration received, the Ser-
vice looked at the specific rights attributable to the father's inter-
est under the partnership agreement. Neither the father's reserved
right to rental payments nor the potential allocation of tax losses
was "reducible to an adequate and full equivalent of a money
value."10 Finally, the Service indicated that the father's interest
was subject to a "buy-out" under the partnership agreement be-
cause the special allocation of losses and excess income distribu-
tions would gradually reduce his capital account to zero. For estate
and gift tax purposes, the Service refused to assign any value to
the buy-out arrangement because it did not represent considera-
tion in money or money's worth.1 07
The Service's position, if upheld, would severely restrict the
partnership freeze technique. In a typical partnership freeze, a ma-
jor portion of the value of the frozen partner's interest consists of a
preferred return on property contributed to the partnership. As a
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible to meet the "ade-
quate and full consideration" standard of section 2036(a) if the
value of the preferred return were disregarded. Thus, the Service's
approach would almost automatically require inclusion of the con-
tributed property under section 2036(a) whenever the preferred re-
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initial exchange would give rise to a taxable gift equal to the excess
in value of the contributed property over the partnership interest
received by the senior generation. To the extent that the frozen
partner actually receives a preferred return, it seems inappropriate
to disregard the preferred return when valuing the frozen interest.
The Service's position seems more justifiable, however, as a re-
sponse to the abusive technique of disproportionate loss allocations
that shift capital from the senior generation to the younger genera-
tion outside the transfer tax base.
I. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: OPERATION OF SECTION 2036(c)
A. Overview
Section 2036(c) was originally included in the revenue-raising
proposals of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 08 The House ver-
sion was considerably simpler and more straightforward than the
statutory provision ultimately enacted in the 1987 Act.109 Under
the House version, property transferred during life subject to a re-
tained interest would have been drawn back into the transferor's
gross estate if the transferred property, "appreciation property,"
represented a disproportionately large share of the potential ap-
preciation. As amended by the Conference Committee, section
2036(c) required inclusion for estate tax purposes only if the trans-
feror held the retained interest at death, or transferred it within
three years of death in conformity with the three-year rule applica-
ble to section 2036 generally. 110 Thus, section 2036(c) could be
avoided by a transfer of the retained interest more than three
108. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DESCRIPTION OF
POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES 266 (1987) (noting that "[t]he parent's estate
could include the full value of property which is effectively subject to the retained life inter-
est (i.e., the common stock as well as the preferred stock, in the recapitalization case ... ");
see also Schlenger & Canning, supra note 7, at 117-18 (discussing legislative history of
§ 2036(c)).
109. The House version of § 2036(c)(1) provided: "In general. - If (A) any person holds a
substantial interest in an enterprise, and (B) such person in effect transfers a disproportion-
ate share of the potential appreciation in the enterprise, then the transferred property shall
be included in his gross estate." H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10108 (1987); see 1987
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1044.
110. As originally enacted in 1987, § 2036(c)(4) provided: "Coordination with section
2035.- For purposes of applying section 2035, any transfer of the retained interest.., shall
be treated as a transfer of an interest in the transferred property .... ." Arguably,
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years before death.11' The statute applied only to estates of per-
sons dying after December 31, 1987, and to transfers made after
December 17, 1987.112 The 1988 Act repealed the three-year rule
and essentially reinstated the broader reinclusion rule originally
contained in the House bill." 3
According to the 1988 House Report, section 2036(c) addresses
two concerns: (i) the creation or transfer of disproportionate inter-
ests in a business or other property that permits the transfer of
wealth outside the transfer tax system and (ii) the retention of a
disproportionate share of the income of, or rights in, an enterprise
in which the transferor "in fact retains enjoyment of the whole en-
terprise.""' 4 The legislative history indicates that a disproportion-
ate transfer of business interests may permit the transmission of
wealth to escape transfer taxes because of undervaluation of the
transferred property at the time of the initial transfer, or because
of the exercise or nonexercise of retained rights subsequent to the
initial transfer." 5 In addition to the valuation problems, Congress
was concerned that a transfer with retained enjoyment until death
was a substitute for a testamentary transfer and therefore should
be drawn back into the transferor's gross estate." 6
The 1988 Act sought to conform section 2036(c) more closely to
its underlying purpose by foreclosing numerous "loopholes," ex-
panding the scope of covered transactions, and adding safe harbors
for certain retained interests."7 It also granted the Treasury broad
regulatory authority to implement the purposes of section 2036(c)
and deter circumvention "through distributions or otherwise.'," 8
§ 2036(c)(4) was redundant because § 2035 already applied to § 2036 transfers. See I.R.C.
§ 2035(d)(2).
111. Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1437. A sale of the retained
interest for its full fair market value within three years of death would not avoid reinclusion.
See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 917-18 (10th Cir. 1961); 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 995 n.1.
112. See 1987 Act, § 10402(b), 101 Stat. at 1330-432 (as amended by the 1988 Act, § 3031,
102 Stat. at 3634).
113. See infra notes 256-91 and accompanying text.
114. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 422-23.
115. Id. at 422.
116. Id. at 423.
117. See infra notes 211-91 and accompanying text.
118. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(8).
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The Treasury's regulatory authority is especially far-reaching be-
cause the statute uses numerous undefined or ambiguous terms.
B. Statutory Terms
Section 2036(c) applies if a person holding a "substantial inter-
est" in an "enterprise" transfers a disproportionately large share of
the potential appreciation while retaining an income interest or
rights in the enterprise.11 The term "enterprise," as used in the
legislative history, "includes a business or other property which
may produce income or gain.' 120 Under the interpretation adopted
by the Service, an enterprise generally includes any "arrangement"
that has "significant business or investment aspects" in light of the
particular facts and circumstances involved.' These definitions
could potentially embrace almost any activity relating to property
held for personal use as well as business or investment property.
The Service has acknowledged, however, that an arrangement in-
volving exclusively "personal use property,"'2 2 such as a life insur-
ance contract or a principal residence, will ordinarily be presumed
not to constitute an enterprise. 23 The Service has also indicated
that a person will not be treated as owning an interest in an enter-
prise based on "incidental or tangential" involvement in another
person's business or investment activities. For example, the Service
does not intend to treat a person who provides property or services
to a family member in the ordinary course of business or in a nom-
inal amount as a transferor under section 2036(c). 24
119. Id. § 2036(c)(1).
120. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 996.
121. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 7. The relevant factors include (i) the capacity to
produce income or gain, (ii) the form of organization, (iii) prior business or investment use
of the property, and (iv) the property's investment potential. Id.
122. Personal use property is property "substantially all of the use of which by the tax-
payer is not in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer or an activity described
in section 212." I.R.C. § 1275(b)(3).
123. The presumption is conclusive if the arrangement involves exclusively property (in-
cluding a "reasonably appropriate" amount of adjacent land) to be used as the principal
residence of the transferor or transferee, or a contract that qualifies as life insurance under §
7702 of the Code. In the case of other kinds of personal use property, the presumption may
be rebutted if the personal use aspects of the arrangement are subordinate to significant
business or investment aspects. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 7 & n.17, exs. 3-8.
124. Id. at 6; see I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(ii) (exception for arm's length transactions).
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A person holds a "substantial interest" only if he owns, directly
or indirectly, 10% or more of the "voting power" or "income
stream" in the enterprise. The terms "voting power" and "income
stream" are not defined in the statute. 1 5 For purposes of the sub-
stantial interest test, a person owns any interest owned directly or
indirectly by family members. 2 " The statute defines the term
"family" to include an individual's spouse, descendants, spouse's
descendants, parents, grandparents, and any spouses of the forgo-
ing. The term does not include siblings. 12 7 Under the Service's at-
tribution rules, any interest in the voting power or income stream
that is owned by an entity other than a trust or estate is generally
treated as owned proportionately by the owners of the correspond-
ing interests in the entity. Special rules apply to interests owned
by trusts and estates.128 The Service has indicated that it will con-
sider adopting safe harbor exceptions for transactions in which the
substantial interest test is satisfied but the presence of unrelated
parties with widely held interests diminishes the risk of a dispro-
portionate transfer. 2
9
The transfer requirement is satisfied if the transferor, "in ef-
fect," transfers a "disproportionately large share" of the potential
appreciation of his interest in the enterprise. 30 The legislative his-
tory indicates that a transfer "encompasses, but is not limited to,
all transactions whereby property is passed to or conferred upon
another, regardless of the means or device employed."'' The "in
125. See infra notes 136-40.
126. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A).
127. Id. § 2036(c)(3)(B). The definition of family is not affected by the spousal unity rule
of § 2036(c)(3)(C). I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 8.
128. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 8. In the case of interests owned by a trust, any
interest in the income stream is treated as owned by the beneficiaries to the maximum
extent of their respective actual or potential shares of trust income or principal, and any
voting power is treated as owned by the transferor to the extent such power is exercisable
(other than in a fiduciary capacity) alone or in conjunction with any other person, by the
transferor or a family member. Interests owned by an estate are treated as owned by the
beneficiaries in proportion to their respective beneficial interests. Id. at exs. 9-12.
129. Id. at n.19 (transaction in which unrelated parties who receive the same treatment as
related parties own more than 50% of the voting power and value of an enterprise).
130. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B); see infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
131. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 996. The Service has reiterated that a
transfer includes "any agreement, arrangement, transaction, act [or] failure to act." I.R.S.
Notice, supra note 11, at 9.
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effect" language is intended to encompass indirect transfers, in-
cluding recapitalizations, stock issuances, and changes in the form
of existing businesses. Section 2036(c) does not specify whether the
enterprise, or the transferor's interest therein, must be in existence
at or before the time of the transfer. 32 In response to the argu-
ment that contributions of property to a newly formed enterprise
fall outside the literal terms of the statute, the Service has inter-
preted the statute to require only that the substantial interest "ex-
ist at the time of the transfer.11 33 Moreover, the Service has taken
the view that an enterprise may exist even though "the specifics of
its business or investment aspects remain undefined.' 31 4 Regard-
less of the sequence of formal steps, a transferor's contribution of
property to a newly formed enterprise could almost certainly be
brought within the ambit of section 2036(c) by recasting the trans-
action as an exchange of a fractional undivided interest in the en-
terprise for a disproportionate interest in the income or rights in
the enterprise.135
Section 2036(c) applies only if the transferor retains an interest
in "the income of, or rights in, the enterprise. "' s A transferor is
deemed to have retained an interest in income or rights if he "has
arranged to receive the income or exercise the rights, whether or
not such arrangement is legally enforceable.' 37 The Conference
Committee Report indicates that the term "rights" includes "vot-
ing rights, conversion rights, liquidation rights, warrants, options,
and other rights of value.' 38 The Service has clarified, however,
that the term "rights" does not include rights to serve exclusively
132. The House version of the 1988 Act would have "clarified" the substantial interest
test to provide that the transferor must hold a substantial interest in the enterprise either
before or after the transfer. The Conference Committee, however, followed the Senate ver-
sion that left the substantial interest test unchanged. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9,
at 424; 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 74.
133. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 10 n.24.
134. Id. at 7. "Thus, an arrangement that contemplates the conduct of an undefined busi-
ness activity or the purchase of unidentified property for investment may be an enterprise."
Id.
135. See id. at 10, ex. 16 (split-interest purchase of securities).
136. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B).
137. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 10-11.
138. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 996.
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in an agency or other fiduciary capacity i3 9 A retained income in-
terest may encompass, subject to certain exceptions, a preferred
equity interest, a promissory note, a life or term interest, an em-
ployment or retirement agreement, or a sale or lease. 4 ' In deter-
mining the extent of the interests or rights retained by the trans-
feror, interests or rights owned by an entity are attributed to the
transferor to the extent of his proportionate interest in the entity.
Forthcoming regulations will prescribe rules for determining the
extent of such indirect ownership. 14 1
C. Disproportionality Requirement
Prior to the 1988 Act, it was unclear whether the disproportion-
ality requirement comprised two separate tests-one relating to
the transferred property and the other relating to the retained in-
terest-or a single test stated in two different ways. 142 The 1988
Act "clarifies" the statute by deleting the disproportionality re-
quirement with respect to the retained interest, leaving the parallel
requirement with respect to the transferred interest unchanged. 143
This change is intended to confirm that "granting a disproportion-
ately large share of potential appreciation necessarily entails the
retention of a disproportionately large share of income or other
rights in the enterprise.'1144
To determine whether a transfer is disproportionate, the Service
looks at whether the ratio of "appreciation" to "value" in the
transferor's interest immediately before the transfer is greater than
the corresponding ratio immediately after the transfer. 45 The ap-
139. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 11, exs. 20-21 (voting power and management rights
exercisable solely in fiduciary capacity).
140. Id.
141. Id.; cf. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A) (attribution only for purposes of the substantial inter-
est test).
142. Former § 2036(c)(1)(B) required that the transferor transfer a disproportionately
large share of the potential appreciation "while retaining a disproportionately large share in
the income of, or rights in, the enterprise." I.R.C. § 2036 (c)(1)(B) (West 1988) (current
version at I.R.C. § 2036 (c)(1)(B)).
143. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B). The 1988 Act described this change as a "clarification of
the retention test." 1988 Act, § 3031, 102 Stat. at 3634.
144. 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 423.
145. The Service describes the disproportionality test in terms of two fractions:
The first [fraction] is the percentage share of the potential appreciation in the
value of the enterprise attributable to the transferor's interest before the trans-
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preciation-to-value ratio is apparently calculated as a fraction in
which the numerator equals the amount of potential appreciation
in the transferor's interest divided by the amount of potential ap-
preciation in the enterprise as a whole, and the denominator
equals the value of the transferor's entire interest divided by the
value of the transferor's entire pre-transfer interest.146 If the pre-
transfer ratio is greater than the post-transfer ratio, the Service
considers the transferor to have transferred a disproportionately
large share of the potential appreciation in his original interest in
the enterprise.
For example, assume that A owns all of the outstanding stock of
X corporation, consisting of 100 shares of preferred stock worth $1
per share and 100 shares of common stock worth $1 per share. The
pre-transfer ratio is 100% [(100/100)/($200/$200)].147 A transfers
10 shares of preferred stock and 50 shares of common stock to his
son, B, and retains 90 shares of preferred stock and 50 shares of
common stock. The post-transfer ratio is approximately 71% [(50/
100)/($140/$200)]. Because the appreciation-to-value ratio has de-
creased, A is considered to have transferred a disproportionately
fer over 100 percent (representing the value of the transferor's interest prior to
the transfer). The second [fraction] is the percentage share of the potential
appreciation in the value of the enterprise attributable to the transferor's in-
terest after the transfer over the value of that interest (expressed as a percent-
age of the value of the transferor's interest immediately prior to the transfer).
If the first fraction is larger than the second (i.e., if the ratio of appreciation to
value is larger before the transfer than after the transfer), the transferor in
effect has transferred a disproportionately large share of the potential appreci-
ation in the value of his or her interest in the enterprise.
I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 9; see 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 427 n.120.
146. The Service's ratios can be expressed in algebraic terms as follows: The pre-transfer
ratio of appreciation to value is equal to a/100%, or a/(x/x), where a represents the percent-
age value of the potential appreciation in the enterprise attributable to the transferor's pre-
transfer interest and x represents the value of the entire pre-transfer interest. The post-
transfer ratio is equal to b/(y/x), where b represents the percentage value of the potential
appreciation in the enterprise attributable to the transferor's post-transfer interest and y
represents the value of the retained interest. Although the term "potential appreciation" is
not defined in the statute, the Service determines potential appreciation "by reference to
the rights that the transferor's interest carries with respect to any future increase in the
value of the enterprise." I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 9.
147. The numerator of the ratio, representing the transferor's percentage share of the
potential appreciation in the enterprise, can be expressed either in terms of value or in
terms of number of shares, assuming that common stock is viewed as appreciation property
and preferred stock is viewed as income property.
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large share of the potential appreciation in his original interest in
X.148
The same analysis apparently applies if the transferor originally
owns less than all of the enterprise. For instance, in the previous
example, assume that A originally owned only 80 out of 100 shares
of preferred stock and 20 out of 100 shares of common stock, and
that A transferred 60 shares of the preferred stock and 15 shares of
the common stock, retaining 20 shares of the preferred stock and 5
shares of the common stock. Prior to the transfer, the ratio of ap-
preciation to value in A's interest would be 20% [(20/100)/($100/
$100)]; after the transfer the ratio would still be 20% [(5/100)/
($25/$100)].
By its terms, the disproportionality requirement could apply to a
typical "common on common" recapitalization, in which the older
generation transfers nonvoting common stock while retaining vot-
ing common stock. Although the voting and nonvoting stock may
be entitled to the same value per share on liquidation, the nonvot-
ing stock has more "leverage," and thus a higher rate of apprecia-
tion per share, because it is presumably less valuable than the vot-
ing stock.150 Nevertheless, the Service has confirmed that section
2036(c) does not apply if the transferred and retained interests dif-
fer only with respect to voting rights.' 51 For this purpose, any ap-
preciation in the transferred and retained interests is deemed to
accrue in proportion to the respective values of the voting and
nonvoting stock.152 Similarly, the distinction between a general and
148. Disproportionality can also be stated in terms of the difference between the reduc-
tion in value of A's preferred stock and the reduction in value of his common stock: Follow-
ing the transfer, A owns 90% ($90/$100) of his original preferred stock, but only 50% ($50/
$100) of his original common stock. A would have to transfer an additional 40 shares of
preferred stock to maintain proportionality.
149. In order to maintain proportionality, A must transfer four shares of preferred stock
for each share of common stock so that the ratio of appreciation to value in his retained
interest will not decrease.
150. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1428. The nonvoting
stock has leverage, by contrast to the voting stock, to the extent that a ratable share of
liquidation preference can be purchased at a discount reflecting the lack of voting power.
151. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 10. The Service reaches this result by assuming that
the value of the voting stock should be determined as if the stock were to be sold prior to
liquidation. This assumption may contradict the reasonably expected facts because closely
held stock is often held until liquidation.
152. See id. at ex. 17.
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limited partnership interest with respect to management rights is
not sufficient by itself to trigger section 2036(c). 153
If the share of potential appreciation attributable to a particular
interest is based on a formula containing variable factors or may
otherwise shift over time, the Service requires that the ratio of po-
tential appreciation to value "be determined by assuming specific
circumstances."'1 54 This hypothetical test is applied by "assuming
circumstances that maximize the share of potential appreciation
attributable to the transferor's interest before the transfer and
minimize the share of potential appreciation attributable to the
transferor's interest after the transfer.' 15 5 Accordingly, the dispro-
portionality requirement is satisfied if "under any reasonably fore-
seeable circumstance" the transferor's share of potential apprecia-
tion would be disproportionately reduced as a result of the
transfer.151 Under the Service's approach, it will be extremely diffi-
cult to demonstrate that in no reasonably foreseeable circumstance
would the transferor's share of potential appreciation be reduced
as the result of the transfer.
In the case of a disproportionate transfer, if the transferor re-
tains an interest in the enterprise, the transferor is generally
treated as if he had retained "the enjoyment of the transferred
property.' ' 57 The statute does not provide any de minimis excep-
tion to the disproportionality rule. If an individual originally owns
100% of an enterprise, consisting of common stock valued at 99%
of the total value of the enterprise and preferred stock valued at
1% of the total value of the enterprise, and transfers the common
stock (but no preferred stock) in a disproportionate transfer, the
153. Id. at ex. 18.
154. Id. at 9 ("Because the rights of the various interests are determined by agreement
between the holders of those interests, it is assumed that there is a reasonable possibility
that any (but not necessarily all) events anticipated by the agreement may, in fact, occur.").
155. Id.
156. Id. Assume that A and B are two equal general partners and that the partnership
agreement provides that gain on disposition of the partnership's property will be allocated
50% to A and 50% to B. If A and B amend the partnership agreement to provide instead
that the first $10OX of gain is allocated to A, the second $100X of gain is allocated to B, and
any further gain above $200X is allocated 25% to A and 75% to B, the Service's approach
requires that the total gain on disposition will exceed $200X. Because A's share of the po-
tential appreciation falls below 50% if the total amount of gain exceeds $200X, the transfer
is considered to be disproportionate. Id. at ex. 14.
157. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1).
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common stock will apparently be drawn back into the transferor's
gross estate at death. If a transfer is only partially disproportion-
ate, however, only the disproportionate part of the transferred
property is subject to section 2036(c). This point is illustrated by
an example in the legislative history:
[If a person who owns a substantial interest in an enterprise
and whose only holdings in the enterprise consist of 100 shares
of common stock and 100 shares of preferred stock transfers 80
shares of the common stock and 20 shares of the preferred stock,
only 60 shares of the transferred common stock are included in
his estate .... 158
To reach the result illustrated by this simple example, the Ser-
vice apparently applies a three-step method. First, it calculates an
inclusion factor. The inclusion factor is equal to the excess of (i)
the value of the income or rights in the retained interest divided
by the value of the income or rights in the pre-transfer interest,
over (ii) the value of the potential appreciation in the retained in-
terest divided by the value of the potential appreciation in the pre-
transfer interest. 5 ' Second, the Service multiplies the inclusion
factor by the total value of the enterprise at the time of the trans-
feror's death to determine a gross inclusion amount.160 Third, the
value of any retained income or rights counted in arriving at the
gross inclusion amount is subtracted from that amount, leaving a
net inclusion amount to be included in the gross estate under sec-
tion 2036(c).' 6 ' As applied to the above example from the legisla-
158. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 996.
159. The inclusion factor can be expressed as [(y - b)/(x - a)] - b/a, in which x represents
the value of the pre-transfer interest, y represents the value of the retained interest, a repre-
sents the value of the potential appreciation in the pre-transfer interest, and b represents
the value of the potential appreciation in the retained interest. Presumably, any portion of
the value of the enterprise or the transferor's interest that is not attributable to potential
appreciation is attributable to income or rights. The inclusion factor represents "It]he por-
tion of the transferred appreciation that is disproportionately large," which is "determined
with reference to the transferor's retained interest in the income of, or rights in, the enter-
prise." I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 5.
160. The gross inclusion amount represents "the value of the portion of the enterprise
that corresponds to the portion of the transferred appreciation that is disproportionately
large." Id.
161. Id. The Service has stated:
To avoid inclusion of the same property under different sections of the Code,
the value of the portion of the enterprise that is includible in the transferor's
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tive history, the inclusion factor would be (80/100 - 20/100), or
60%. Assuming that the value of each share of stock was $1 at the
time of the transfer, that the value of the preferred stock remains
unchanged, and that the value of each share of common stock in-
creases to $2 by the time of the transferor's death (so that the total
value of the enterprise is then $300), the gross inclusion amount
would be 60% of $300, or $180. The net inclusion amount, how-
ever, would be only $120, reflecting a $60 reduction for the value of
the preferred stock included in the gross inclusion amount and in-
dependently includible in the transferor's gross estate under sec-
tion 2033. Thus, the net inclusion amount should be equal to the
value at the transferor's death of the 60 shares of common stock
that constituted a disproportionate transfer of potential
appreciation.
If the transferor originally owns less than all of the enterprise,
however, the inclusion factor presumably should be applied only to
the aggregate date-of-death value of the transferor's original inter-
est; otherwise, the Service's three-step method would overstate the
gross inclusion amount. For example, assume that corporation X
has outstanding 50 shares of preferred stock (worth $1 per share)
and 100 shares of common stock (worth $2 per share), and that A
originally owns 40 shares of the preferred stock and 20 shares of
the common stock. Assume further that A transfers 5 shares of
preferred stock and 15 shares of common stock to a family mem-
ber, retaining 35 shares of preferred stock and 5 shares of common
stock. The transfer constitutes a disproportionate transfer with re-
spect to a portion of the transferred common stock. After the
transfer, A has retained 87.5% (35/40) of his original interest in
the income property and 25% (5/20) of his original interest in the
appreciation property. Assuming that the value of the enterprise as
estate under section 2036(c) is reduced to the extent that the value of the cor-
responding portion of the transferor's retained interest or rights is includible in
the transferor's gross estate under section 2033.
Id.; see I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5) (adjustment for value of retained interest). The Service's method
is apparently intended to give meaning to the statutory provision for "[a]ppropriate adjust-
ments... for the value of the retained interest." Id. A simpler way to reach the intended
result would be to multiply the inclusion factor by the aggregate date-of-death value of the
appreciation property owned by the transferor immediately before the transfer. This would
prevent the value of the nonappreciation property from entering into the calculation and
avoid the need to subtract that value from the gross inclusion amount.
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a whole is still $250 at A's death, the combined value of A's origi-
nal preferred and common stock at that time ($80) will represent
only 32% of the total value of the enterprise ($250). The inclusion
factor representing the excess percentage of the retained income
property (62.5%) should accordingly be applied to 32% of the total
date-of-death value of the enterprise, yielding a gross inclusion
amount of $50 (62.5% X 32% X $250). This amount should be
reduced by $25 (representing the value of the preferred stock
counted as part of the gross inclusion amount and independently
includible in A's gross estate under section 2033), yielding a net
inclusion amount of $25.112 The net inclusion amount is equal to
the value of the 12.5 shares of transferred common stock that con-
stituted a disproportionate transfer of potential appreciation.6 3
If the total value of the enterprise in the previous example in-
creased to $450 at A's death and the entire $200 of appreciation
were allocated to the common stock, the inclusion factor (62.5%)
would be applied to 27% ($120/$450) of the value of the enterprise
at A's death and the gross inclusion amount would be $75."" The
reduction for the retained preferred stock would still be $25, yield-
ing a net inclusion amount of $50. This amount corresponds to the
date-of-death value of the excess 12.5 shares of common stock.
162. One can determine the amount of the adjustment for the retained interest by multi-
plying the inclusion factor (62.5%) by the percentage of the nonappreciation property in the
enterprise originally owned by A (40 of the 50 shares of preferred stock originally outstand-
ing or 80%) and multiplying that product by the value of the nonappreciation property at
the time of A's death ($50).
163. This result can be verified by calculating the "excess" number of shares of trans-
ferred common stock as follows: A retained 87.5% (35/40) of his original preferred stock,
and thus would have had to retain an equivalent percentage (87.5% x 20 shares or 17.5
shares) of his original common stock to avoid making a disproportionate transfer. Because A
retained only 5 shares (rather than 17.5 shares) of common stock, the difference of 12.5
shares represents the excess amount of the transferred common stock.
164. The portion of the date-of-death value of the enterprise to which the inclusion factor
applies is determined as follows: A originally owned 40 shares of preferred stock and 20
shares of common stock. The date-of-death value of those shares is the sum of $40 (40
shares of preferred stock at $1 per share) and $80 (20 shares of common stock at $4 per
share), or $120, which in turn represents 27% of the total date-of-death value of the
enterprise.
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D. Unitary Rule for Spouses
A special rule provides that an individual and spouse shall be
treated as one person, except as otherwise provided in regula-
tions.165 This rule is intended to prevent an individual from
manipulating the retention requirement of section 2036(c) by
transferring appreciation property to a family member and simul-
taneously transferring the retained interest to a spouse. 168 The uni-
tary rule for spouses could be read to require inclusion of the
transferred property in the estate of the first spouse to die and
again in the surviving spouse's estate.16 7 To prevent double inclu-
sion, the 1988 Act gives the Treasury regulatory authority to over-
ride the unitary rule in appropriate circumstances. 168
The Service has determined that the principal purpose of the
unitary rule is to identify the spouse who is considered the trans-
feror for purposes of section 2036(c). 16 9 Moreover, the Service has
indicated that the unitary rule should be generally limited to non-
taxable interspousal transfers, namely, transfers that qualify for
the marital deduction or the annual exclusion. According to the
Service, Congress believed that such transfers posed a greater po-
tential for abuse than interspousal transfers that are fully subject
to transfer tax. Based on these considerations, the Service has an-
nounced four operating rules for applying the unitary rule. 170
First, in the case of a lifetime interspousal transfer of all or an
undivided portion of the retained interest or rights not subject to
165. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C).
166. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1422. Under I.R.C. §
2036(c)(4), a deemed gift of the appreciation property occurs if the original transferor subse-
quently transfers the retained interest. See infra notes 256-68 and accompanying text. The
Service has clarified, however, that a nontaxable interspousal transfer of the retained inter-
est does not trigger a deemed gift of the appreciation property. See I.R.S. Notice, supra
note 11, at 14-15.
167. For example, assume that H transfers preferred stock to W, H's spouse, and common
stock to their child. If H and W are treated as a single individual, both the common stock
and the preferred stock would be drawn back into H's gross estate at his death. Although
the preferred stock transferred to W might qualify for the marital deduction, the common
stock would be fully taxable in H's gross estate. At W's death, all of the stock would be fully
taxable in her gross estate. The value of the common stock would thus be taxed once in H's
estate and again in W's estate without any offset for the prior inclusion.
168. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C); see also 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75.
169. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 14.
170. See id.
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gift or estate tax, the transferee spouse is substituted as the trans-
feror with respect to a corresponding portion of the appreciation
property. Moreover, the interspousal transfer is not treated as a
taxable event under section 2036(c), and the transaction is held
"open" until the transferee spouse subsequently disposes of the re-
tained interest.17 1 Second, in the case of a lifetime interspousal
transfer of all or an undivided portion of the retained interest that
is subject to estate or gift tax, the transfer results in a deemed
termination of the original transferor's retained interest, triggering
a taxable event under section 2036(c). The transaction is thus
treated as "closed," and further application of section 2036(c) is
precluded with respect to the retained interest in the transferee
spouse's hands. Third, in the case of an interspousal transfer of a
divided interest in the retained interest that results in both
spouses' retaining interests or rights with respect to the same por-
tion of the enterprise, the transferor spouse is treated as the owner
of the retained interest for purposes of section 2036(c) until
death. 17 2 Fourth, the unitary rule generally does not require that
section 2036(c) apply to a disproportionate transfer that occurs as
a result of the transferor's death.
For purposes of these operating rules, an interspousal transfer
generally is considered subject to transfer tax except to the extent
that it is sheltered by the annual gift tax exclusion or the estate or
gift tax marital deduction, or is for adequate and full considera-
tion.'7 3 Under a special rule, an interspousal grant of a general
power of appointment is treated as a "transfer subject to the trans-
fer tax" if (i) the power, by it terms, lapses before the later of the
ninetieth day after it is granted or the end of the calendar year in
which it is granted; (ii) the power is not exercised to any extent
during such period; and (iii) the lapse of the power is not treated
to any extent as a taxable release under the "five or five" rule of
171. The transferee spouse ceases to be considered the transferor if the original transferor
subsequently reacquires the retained interest in a nontaxable interspousal transfer. See id.
at 14-15, ex. 30 (reacquisition restores transferor status).
172. At the transferor spouse's death, if the transferee spouse survives, either a taxable
event or a shift in transferor status will occur, depending on the taxable or nontaxable na-
ture of the original interspousal transfer. Id. at 15, ex. 38.
173. Id. at 14.
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section 2514(e).17 4 For example, assume that H transfers a portion
of the retained interest to a trust, under the terms of which W, H's
spouse, has a right to withdraw up to $5,000 of any contribution
within the current calendar year. If the special rule applies, the
transfer to the trust will be treated as a taxable event under sec-
tion 2036(c)(4) with respect to H, and W will not be treated as the
original transferor with respect to any portion of the appreciation
property.17 5 In the absence of the special rule, the transfer to the
trust would generally cause W to be substituted as the original
transferor with respect to a portion of the appreciation property,
triggering a taxable event under section 2036(c) upon disposition
or termination of W's interest in the retained property.7 6
The operating rules generally allow the parties considerable flex-
ibility in treating one spouse or the other as the transferor and in
controlling the timing of the taxable event for purposes of section
2036(c). Because a taxable interspousal transfer precludes further
application of section 2036(c) with respect to the transferee spouse,
any subsequent appreciation in the value of the enterprise attribu-
table to the appreciation property will not be drawn back into the
transferee spouse's estate. It is also possible to achieve a limited
freeze for the surviving spouse's lifetime if the transferor spouse
dies leaving preferred stock to the surviving spouse and common
stock to the children. 7 According to the Service, the exception for
transfers at death is appropriate because "such transfers present
limited opportunities for the kinds of abuses that Congress had in
mind when it enacted section 2036(c). 117 8 The Service is consider-
ing regulations that would permit an election to terminate applica-
tion of the unitary rule upon the original transferor's death. 79
174. Id; see I.R.C. § 2514(e).
175. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 15, ex. 37.
176. See id. at ex. 33.
177. See id. at ex. 39. But cf. id. at ex. 40 (right of transferee spouse, acting in nonfiduci-
ary capacity, to allocate assets in residuary estate).
178. Id. at 14. The guidance warns, however, that this exception does not apply if the
transferor's spouse is, in substance, the transferor. Id.
179. See id. Under this option, a deceased transferor's executor could elect to include in
the transferor's gross estate the value of any appreciation property with respect to which the
decedent's spouse would otherwise be substituted as transferor under the unitary rule. Id.
For example, assume that the decedent made a lifetime transfer of common stock to a child
and preferred stock to a spouse. The election would permit the executor to include the value
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E. Proportional Exclusion for Consideration
No exception for bona fide sales applies to a transfer described
in section 2036(c) if the transferee is a member of the transferor's
family. e0 Thus, a sale to a family member of the appreciation
property for adequate and full consideration will not prevent the
appreciation property from being drawn back into the transferor's
gross estate if the transferor retains a prohibited interest in the
enterprise. If the transferor receives consideration for the trans-
ferred property, an offset is provided in determining the amount
reincluded in the transferor's gross estate under section 2036(c). 181
Moreover, if the initial transfer constitutes a taxable gift, the
amount of the gift will be eliminated in computing the transferor's
adjusted taxable gifts under section 2001(b), and the transferor
will be allowed a credit for the gift tax previously paid.18 2 The
transferor's estate also has a statutory right of recovery against the
recipient of section 2036 property for a pro rata share of the fed-
eral estate tax.18 3
Generally, the retained-interest provisions of sections 2036
through 2038 are intended to prevent a transferor from depleting
his gross estate through an inter vivos transfer of property for in-
of the child's common stock in the decedent's gross estate, thereby terminating application
of § 2036(c) with respect to the transferee spouse. Id.
180. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(A). For this purpose, the transferor's "family" is defined in
§ 2036(c)(3)(B). In addition, the Service has ifidicated that this definition also includes
"certain members of the transferor's spouse's family and any trust in which a member of the
transferor's family holds a present or future beneficial interest (including an interest as an
eligible recipient under a power of appointment held by a member of the transferor's fam-
ily)." I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 15.
181. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B); see infra notes 184-207 and accompanying text.
182. See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (defining cumulative transfer tax base to include the taxable
estate and post-1976 taxable gifts other than those included in the taxable estate). This
provision ensures that transfers subject to both gift and estate tax will ultimately be in-
cluded in the transfer tax base at the date-of-death value. See id.
183. I.R.C. § 2207B(a). With respect to amounts includible "solely by reason of section
2036(c)," the right of recovery applies as if § 2207B(a) had been included in the 1987 Act.
See 1988 Act, § 3031(h)(1), 102 Stat. at 3639. With respect to amounts includible under
§ 2036 "other than solely by reason of section 2036(c)," the right of recovery applies only
with respect to transfers of property with a retained interest made after the date of enact-
ment of the 1988 Act. Id. § 3031(h)(3), 102 Stat. at 3639. Unless the right of recovery is
specifically waived, the estate's failure to enforce its recovery rights will apparently give rise
to a taxable gift when such right of recovery ceases to be enforceable. See I.R.C. §
2207B(a)(2); see also infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
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adequate consideration. Under the general rule of section 2036(a),
however, an inter vivos transfer for adequate and full consideration
is not drawn back into the transferor's gross estate. Because the
transferred property is replaced by assets of equal value, the trans-
action is presumed not to have diminished the transferor's gross
estate. The section 2036(a) exception for bona fide sales thus en-
sures that the transferor's gross estate will not be increased
through an unwarranted inclusion of both the transferred property
and the consideration that is a substitute for the transferred prop-
erty. In the case of a transfer for partial consideration, section 2043
serves a similar function by allowing a partial offset to the value of
the transferred property drawn back into the transferor's gross
estate.
The treatment of consideration in a section 2036(c) transfer re-
quires careful attention. Unless the amount includible under sec-
tion 2036(c) is reduced or eliminated to the extent of any consider-
ation received in the original transfer, the transferor will be
overtaxed. As originally enacted, the statute provided that, in lieu
of the consideration offset provisions of section 2043, "appropriate
adjustments shall be made for the value of the retained inter-
est."'18 4 Without additional clarification, this language was virtually
unintelligible. 8 An example in the legislative history indicated
that Congress intended to allow an adjustment at least to the ex-
tent of the consideration received on the initial transfer. 8" It was
unclear, however, whether Congress intended the provision to per-
mit compounding the consideration to reflect the full date-of-death
value of such consideration or its proceeds in the transferor's gross
estate. If compounding were not permitted, an intrafamily sale
would be treated in effect more harshly than if the transferor had
retained his entire interest in the enterprise until death. The pro-
posed Senate amendment to section 2036(c) would have adopted
rules similar to those of section 2043 and would have directed the
Secretary of the Treasury to undertake a study concerning "the
184. Former § 2036(c)(5) provided: "Coordination with section 2043. - In lieu of apply-
ing section 2043, appropriate adjustments shall be made for the value of the retained inter-
est." I.R.C. § 2036 (c)(5) (West 1988) (current version at I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5)).
185. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1426-27; see also
I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 5-6.
186. 1987 CONFEREMNc REPORT, supra note 8, at 997.
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appropriate adjustment for consideration under 2036(c)."18 The
Conference Committee, however, established a new rule to deter-
mine the excludible portion of property transferred for partial con-
sideration in an intrafamily sale.'
Under the new rule, a portion of the enterprise's value is ex-
cluded from the transferor's gross estate under section 2036(c).
The excluded amount is equal to the date-of-death value of the
enterprise multiplied by an "applicable fraction," the numerator of
which is the amount of the consideration received and the denomi-
nator of which is the total value of the retained and transferred
interests immediately after the transfer. 8 9 This rule applies, how-
ever, only upon a showing that the person providing the considera-
tion originally owned such consideration and never received or ac-
quired it, directly or indirectly, from the transferor for less than
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.190 The
requirement concerning the origin of the consideration was appar-
ently modeled directly on the similar provision in section
2040(a).191
The Conference Report illustrates application of the new provi-
sion with an example in which a parent owns all of the common
and preferred stock in a corporation worth $2,000,000. If the par-
ent sells the common stock to the child for $1,000,000, which was
not directly or indirectly received or acquired from the parent, and
continues to hold the preferred stock until death, one half of the
corporation's value will be includible in the parent's gross estate. 92
At the parent's death, if the entire corporation is worth $3,000,000
and the preferred stock is still worth $1,000,000, the amount in-
cludible in the parent's estate under sections 2033 and 2036(c) will
be $1,500,000: $1,000,000 of preferred stock and $500,000 of com-
mon stock. 93 The remaining $1,500,000 of common stock is exclud-
187. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.
188. Id. at 76; see infra notes 189-208 and accompanying text.
189. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B). The statutory language does not precisely track the in-
tended result. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
190. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i)(II).
191. See I.R.C. § 2040(a) (relating to proportionate inclusion in the gross estate of jointly
owned property with a right of survivorship).
192. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 76.
193. Id. (referring to certain adjustments for the value of the retained interest intended
to prevent double inclusion).
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ible from the parent's gross estate under the proportional exclusion
rule.
Congress apparently intends the proportional exclusion rule to
approximate the result that would have occurred in the absence of
a disproportionate transfer if each class of stock shared equally in
the appreciation of the enterprise as a whole. The example in the
Conference Report, however, illustrates a result that may be diffi-
cult to reach under the literal language of the statute. The statute
describes the denominator of the applicable fraction as the value of
"the portion of the enterprise which would [otherwise] have been
included in the gross estate of the transferor by reason of [section
2036(c)] (determined without regard to any reduction.., for the
value of the retained interest)" immediately after the transfer.""
One might argue that only the value of the transferred interest is
included under section 2036(c), while the value of the retained in-
terest is technically included under section 2033. This reading of
the statute would exclude the value of the retained interest from
the denominator of the applicable fraction, producing a result
quite different from that described in the Conference Report.195
This interpretation of the statute seems untenable for two rea-
sons. First, it ignores the parenthetical language indicating that
the denominator of the applicable fraction is to be determined
"without regard to any reduction ... for the value of the retained
interest."' 196 Although the drafters apparently overlooked the tech-
nical distinction between section 2036(c) and section 2033 as the
basis for including the retained interest in the gross estate, they
evidently contemplated that the value of the retained interest
would be included in the denominator of the applicable fraction.
Second, a literal interpretation would reinstate in effect bona fide
sale treatment for intrafamily transfers generally. Pending further
guidance, the Service appears to interpret the ambiguous statutory
194. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B).
195. In the Conference example, the applicable fraction would be 1/1 ($1,000,000/
$1,000,000) based on this interpretation. The value of the common stock drawn back into
the transferor's gross estate would then be zero, regardless of the total value of the common
stock and preferred stock at the time of death. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at
76.
196. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i).
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language as intended to accomplish the result described in the leg-
islative history.'97
The statute gives the Treasury broad authority to issue regula-
tions that specify when the consideration received will be pre-
sumed not to have been acquired or received from the original
transferor. 198 The legislative history provides that such regulations,
when issued, may require a higher standard of proof or raise a pre-
sumption linking consideration to prior gifts made by the trans-
feror to the transferee within a certain period of time. 99 The Ser-
vice has established a rebuttable presumption that consideration
furnished by the transferee is derived from the transferor. 00 To
rebut this presumption, the transferor or his estate must establish
to the Service's satisfaction that (i) the transferee at some time
received sufficient property from sources other than the transferor
to enable the transferee to accumulate such consideration, assum-
ing only a reasonable rate of growth, and (ii) the transferee's abil-
ity to furnish such consideration was to no extent dependent on
receipt of any property from the transferor during the three years
immediately preceding the transfer.20 1 For this purpose, "property
acquired or received from the transferor" includes property de-
rived from the transferor's spouse, and any proceeds, income or
gain from property is traced to the same source as the underlying
property.0 2 Borrowed proceeds are treated as derived from the
transferor only if they are (i) borrowed from the transferor under a
below-market "gift loan" within the meaning of section 7872(f)(3),
or (ii) borrowed from persons other than the transferor to the ex-
tent that the transferee's repayment obligation is guaranteed or
collateralized by the transferor for less than adequate and full con-
197. Without expressly addressing the statutory ambiguity, the Service has reiterated
that the denominator of the fraction is "the value of the portion of the enterprise that
would have been includible in the transferor's gross estate under section 2036(c) had the
transferor died immediately after the transfer, including the value of the retained interest."
I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 16.
198. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i)(II); see also 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at
76 ("The conferees intend that the Secretary of the Treasury promulgate regulations as are
deemed appropriate . . ").
199. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 76.
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sideration.2 03 Any property originally acquired from the transferor
for adequate and full consideration is deemed to be derived from
the transferor only if the original consideration was itself derived
from the transferor under the above rules.
In some ways, the requirements set forth in the guidance are rel-
atively lenient. For example, gifts from grandparents are treated as
derived from a source other than the transferor. Thus, if the trans-
feror demonstrates that the transferee could have accumulated an
amount equal to the consideration based on such prior gifts plus a
reasonable return, no portion of the consideration will be treated
as derived from the transferor.20 4 This favorable treatment as-
sumes that the transferee did not receive any property from the
transferor within the three-year period before the transfer. If the
three-year rule is applicable, the transferor must also demonstrate
that the transferee's financial ability to furnish such consideration
was to no extent dependent upon such consideration. For example,
assume that a transferee receives $25 from the transferor within
the three-year period and uses the cash to purchase Blackacre. If
the fair market value of Blackacre is $50 when the appreciation
property is sold, $50 of the consideration is presumed to be tainted
because of the prior cash gift.205 The Service has provided one ex-
ample of circumstances in which the presumption is considered
conclusive.206 If money is considered fungible for these purposes,
however, it may be difficult to show that the transferee's financial
ability to furnish consideration was independent of the prior gift.
Pending further clarification, a prudent transferor would avoid any
gifts to the transferee within the three-year period.
If the standard of proof is not met, it remains unclear how the
adjustment for consideration received will be determined. The
statute specifically provides that the proportional exclusion rule
takes the place of section 2043, but does not specify whether sec-
203. Id.
204. Id. at ex. 41.
205. See id. at ex. 43.
206. See id. at ex. 45. In the example, the transferee uses cash received from the trans-
feror within the three-year period to satisfy a margin call. But for the cash, the transferee
would have had to sell or encumber Blackacre to satisfy the margin call. Because the trans-
feree uses Blackacre plus cash as consideration for the appreciation property, a portion of
the consideration is considered tainted.
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tion 2043 may apply if the new rule is inoperative in a particular
case.2"7 If section 2043 applies in these situations, the adjustment
is apparently limited to the value of the consideration received at
the time of the original transfer. For example, if the appreciation
property is sold to a nonfamily member for less than adequate and
full consideration, the provisions of section 2043 may control be-
cause the proportional exclusion rule of section 2036(c) is inappli-
cable. A bargain sale to a nonfamily member may thus be treated
more harshly for purposes of the consideration offset than a similar
sale to a family member. This apparently inadvertent result is dif-
ficult to justify on policy grounds.
The statute contains new language requiring an appropriate ad-
justment for the "value of the retained interest, extraordinary dis-
tributions, and changes in the capital structure of the enterprise"
occurring after the transfer that triggers section 2036(c). 0 s The
statute also grants broad regulatory authority to the Treasury to
prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of section 2036(c)
and to "prevent avoidance of its purposes through distributions or
otherwise."209 For example, the regulations might treat distribu-
tions to the transferee as giving rise to a deemed gift if the distri-
bution is substantially equivalent to a liquidation of the enterprise
or would otherwise permit circumvention of the statutory
purpose.21 0
III. SCOPE OF SECTION 2036(c): CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES
A. Overview
Prior to the 1988 Act, the estate planning bar advocated outright
repeal of the statute,21' or at least considerable narrowing of its
scope through more precise definitions of its vague and ambiguous
terms.212 Instead of refining the positive scope of section 2036(c),
the 1988 Act carved out safe harbor exceptions for certain kinds of
transactions. This approach not only sidestepped several difficult
207. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(iii).
208. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5).
209. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 421.
210. Id.
211. ABA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 10.
212. See Moore Statement, supra note 10.
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policy issues, but also left continuing uncertainty about the appli-
cation of section 2036(c) to transactions falling outside the safe
harbors. In the 1988 Act, Congress also sought to tighten the oper-
ation of the statute to close perceived loopholes. The new rules
concerning deemed gift treatment and terminations add considera-
ble complexity to the original statute and significantly broaden its
scope.
B. Safe Harbors
The original version of section 2036(c) gave rise to speculation
that the term "income" might be interpreted to include interest on
debt, compensation arrangements, director's fees, and intrafamily
royalties or rents. 13 The 1988 Act addressed the retention of such
nonequity rights only obliquely through safe harbor provisions for
clearly nonabusive transactions. In light of the legislative history
indicating that Congress intended no inference concerning the ap-
plication of the statute to transactions falling outside the terms of
the safe harbors, 214 some commentators suggested that the safe
harbors should be disregarded in defining the positive scope of sec-
tion 2036(c). The Service has rejected this view, stating that by
"reasonable inference" the nonexclusive safe harbors "illustrate
the types of arrangements that are within the scope of the
statute. '21 5
1. Loans
The Service has indicated that, absent a specific safe harbor, a
loan to a new or existing enterprise generally triggers a dispropor-
tionate transfer under section 2036(c). The disproportionality test
is applied by "comparing the proportionate undivided share of
ownership rights in the enterprise originating with such loan ...
with the share of each such right actually allocated to the trans-
213. See Dees, supra note 9, at 884.
214. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 424.
215. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 5. The Service rejects the contrary argument because
it "implies that Congress either did not know what it intended or added the exceptions as a
meaningless appendage." Id. at n.2. If an arrangement is "similar in purpose and effect" to
an arrangement covered by a statutory exception, the application of § 2036(c) depends on
examination of all relevant facts and circumstances. Id. at 11.
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feror."21 6 In determining the ratio of appreciation to value before
the transfer, the lender is treated as if he had acquired an undi-
vided fractional interest in the enterprise equal to the amount of
the loan divided by the value of the enterprise including the
loan.21 ' This fraction is compared to the ratio of appreciation to
value after the transfer based on the lender's actual rights. For ex-
ample, assume that A makes a loan of $50 to a business worth $100
before the loan. A is deemed to have acquired a one-third ($50/
$150) share of the enterprise, or 33% of the potential appreciation
and income. After the transfer, A has none of the potential appre-
ciation because he has traded his one-third share of potential ap-
preciation for an income interest. 18
Because a loan provides capital that may be used to generate
future appreciation, the Service views loan transactions as raising
valuation problems similar to those addressed generally by section
2036(c). In the family context, it is difficult to determine whether a
loan bears an adequate rate of interest, taking into account the
riskiness of the enterprise. Any safe harbor based on the the appli-
cable federal rate is likely to understate the interest rate that a
third-party lender would require in an arm's length transaction,
because the applicable federal rate reflects the low-risk borrowing
rate of the federal government. If the transferor receives a below-
market rate of interest, the excess value attributable to the loan
may be disproportionately shifted. Evidently, the Service consid-
ered the provisions of section 7872 concerning below-market in-
trafamily loans insufficient to safeguard against such disguised
wealth transfers.
Congress created a safe harbor, however, for "qualified debt"
meeting certain statutory requirements. 2 9 The legislative history
explains that a safe harbor is appropriate because qualified debt is
easily valued, provides limited opportunities for disguised wealth
transfers, and does not constitute retained enjoyment of the enter-
prise.22 0 The primary importance of the safe harbor for qualified
216. Id. at 10.
217. The value of the enterprise is increased by the amount of the loan because any re-
payment obligation is ignored for purposes of this test. Id. at 9-10.
218. See id. at ex. 15 (capital contribution treated the same as a loan).
219. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C).
220. See 1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 527.
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debt is apparently to permit an installment redemption of the sen-
ior generation's entire stock interest.22' In the absence of such a
safe harbor, an installment redemption might be treated as an "in
effect" transfer to the nonredeeming family members, coupled with
a retained interest. Although an installment redemption may thus
avoid adverse estate tax consequences, the 1988 Act rendered cer-
tain installment sales of closely held business interests less attrac-
tive for income tax purposes.222
Qualified debt must constitute debt "within the generally ac-
cepted meaning of that term. 2 23 Qualified debt must also provide
for fixed payments on specified dates and must have a fixed matur-
ity date not more than 15 years from the date of issue, or 30 years
in the case of debt secured by real property.22 4 Although qualified
debt must be paid generally on or before the fixed maturity date,
this requirement does not apply if a business purpose exists for
nonpayment of the debt, such as when immediate payment would
reduce the holder's ability ultimately to collect the entire debt.225
The requirement that the loan be payable on one or more fixed
dates does not apply to indebtedness payable on demand if such
indebtedness is issued in return for cash to be used in meeting the
normal business needs of the enterprise.228 The only amount per-
mitted to be paid in addition to the principal of qualified debt is
interest that (i) must be calculated at a fixed rate or a rate deter-
mined by reference to a specified market rate, and (ii) is payable
221. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), (c) (complete termination of shareholder's interest and waiver
of family attribution rules, respectively).
222. See I.R.C. § 453A, as amended by the 1988 Act, § 5076, 102 Stat. at 3682 (imposing
an interest charge for the deferred tax liability on certain installment sales); see also
Bogdanski & Brown, supra note 9, at 1641 n.64. Under § 453(k), use of the installment
method is not permitted for sales of publicly traded securities. I.R.C. § 453(k).
223. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 424-25; see also, e.g., Estate of Mixon v.
United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1972); Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d
965, 968-69 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Hambuechen v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 90, 101 (1964) (distin-
guishing bona fide debt from a capital contribution).
224. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(i)(II). The Service has indicated that the safe harbor does not
apply to debt if the repayment term is "substantially in excess of that offered by commer-
cial lenders for similar loans." I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 12.
225. 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 74. Debt is not disqualified merely be-
cause the obligor has a right to prepay the loan, but a self-cancelling note does not meet the
requirements for the qualified debt safe harbor. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 12.
226. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(last sentence).
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on fixed dates. In addition, qualified debt (i) may not be subordi-
nated by its terms to the claims of general creditors, (ii) may not
be convertible, and (iii) may not grant or restrict voting rights ex-
cept in case of default.227
A separate safe harbor exists for "qualified startup debt."22 Al-
though the statute does not specifically define the term "startup,"
the legislative history indicates that the requirements for qualified
debt are relaxed in the case of startup debt because of the likeli-
hood that appreciation in the enterprise's value will be attributable
primarily to the entrepreneurial efforts of the younger generation
transferee.229 Qualified startup debt must require unconditionally
the payment of a sum certain in money and must be received in
exchange for cash to be used in an enterprise involving an active
trade or business.2 30 In addition, the obligor may not have trans-
ferred any noncash property (including goodwill but disregarding
prior incidental transfers and transfers occurring within the ordi-
nary course of business)231 or have transferred customers or busi-
ness opportunities at any time to the enterprise.2 2 The obligor also
may not hold any interest in the enterprise other than qualified
startup debt, including an interest as an officer, director, or em-
ployee, at any time.2 3 Any person who would otherwise be consid-
ered an "original transferee" of appreciation property must also
participate in the active management of the enterprise. 234 Unlike
the safe harbor for "qualified debt," the qualified startup debt pro-
vision does not impose a fixed maturity requirement, but is limited
to active businesses.
227. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(vi); see 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 74.
228. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D).
229. See 1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 528.
230. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D)(ii)(I)-(II).
231. The Service has acknowledged that neither prior incidental transfers nor transfers
occurring in the ordinary course of business violate this requirement. Moreover, any transfer
that occurs more than three years before acquisition of the startup debt is ignored in deter-
mining whether the requirements of the safe harbor are met. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at
12.
232. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D)(ii)(III).
233. Id. at (IV).
234. Id. at (V). As defined in § 2032A(e)(12), "[ft]he term 'active management' means the
making of the management decisions of a business (other than the daily operating deci-
sions)." Id. § 2032A(e)(12).
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The Service has indicated that it intends to establish a safe har-
bor for certain preferred interests that generally meet require-
ments similar to those for qualified startup debt.23 To qualify for
the Service's new safe harbor: (i) The preferred interest must be in
a new enterprise, rather than in a continuation of or successor to
an existing enterprise; (ii) the new enterprise must have been
formed to conduct an active business; (iii) any person who would
otherwise be considered an original transferee must also partici-
pate in the active management of the business; and (iv) the pre-
ferred interest must have rights and privileges that are analogous
to those of straight debt.2 36 Moreover, the restrictions on prohib-
ited transfers and the holding of other interests under the safe har-
bor for qualified startup debt also apply to the receipt of a pre-
ferred interest in such a new enterprise.3 7
2. Sales or leases; employment contracts
The statute also provides a safe harbor for rights under an arm's
length contract for the sale or lease of property or provision of ser-
vices, as long as the contract does not otherwise involve any change
in interests in the enterprise.238 Payments under the contract may
not be determined by reference to gross receipts, income, profits or
similar items of the enterprise.239 In the case of services, this ex-
ception does not apply if the contract provides for services to be
rendered over a period longer than three years after the date of the
transfer, including extensions at the option of the service pro-
vider.24 ° If the arm's length requirement is not met because the
235. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 12.
236. Generally, such a preferred interest must be entitled to a cumulative dividend with a
fixed rate of return and have a right to a nonlapsing liquidation preference, including the
right to accumulated dividends. In addition, it must be nonvoting and must not be redeem-
able for less than par plus accumulated dividends or convertible into nonqualifiying stock.
Id.
237. Such a preferred interest may, however, be held in conjunction with qualified startup
debt. Id.
238. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(ii). The requirement that the agreement not otherwise
alter the interests in the enterprise is intended merely to preclude issuance of preferred
stock and similar equity interests as compensation for entering into the agreement or pro-
viding services under the agreement. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 13.
239. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(B)(ii).
240. Id. § 2036(c)(7)(B)(i). An employment agreement extending beyond the three-year
term will nevertheless be treated as falling within the safe harbor if it is terminable by the
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compensation for services is unreasonable, the retained income in-
terest may cause section 2036(c) to apply.
3. Options and buy-sell agreements
A statutory safe harbor also exists for "[a]n option or other
agreement to buy or sell property at the fair market value of such
property as of the time the option is (or the rights under the agree-
ment are) exercised."'241 An option, prior to its exercise by the
holder, may be analogized to convertible preferred stock because
the optionor retains rights equivalent to those of a preferred stock-
holder and the optionee receives any equity growth.242 Under prior
law, a person might grant an option to family members to acquire
common stock at a formula price fixed at the time of grant.2 41 If
the option was exercised prior to the transferor's death, the appre-
ciation in the optioned stock escaped transfer tax. If the transferor
died before exercising the option, the estate tax value of the op-
tioned stock was limited to the option price, provided that the op-
tion agreement represented a "bona fide business arrangement and
not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects of
his bounty for less than adequate and full consideration. ' 24 4 Under
present section 2036(c), however, the value of the optioned stock is
determined without regard to the option.
The fair market value requirement also applies to "other agree-
ment[s] to buy or sell property, "245 including buy-sell agreements
between family members. A buy-sell agreement represents a rela-
tively inexpensive means of shifting future appreciation, but avoids
the need to sacrifice control of the property during lifetime, in con-
employer at-will or for reasonable cause. For purposes of the safe harbor, a covenant not to
compete is treated as an agreement to provide services. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at
13.
241. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(iii).
242. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1432-33.
243. See, e.g., Dorn v. United States, 828 F.2d 177 (3rd Cir. 1987); see also Rev. Rul. 80-
186, 1980-2 C.B. 280 (gift tax value of an option must reflect appreciation potential).
244. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h).
245. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(iii); see 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 427. Prior to the
1988 Act, the legislative history provided oblique support for the proposition that section
2036(c) did not encompass buy-sell agreements. See 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
8, at 996 (section 2036(c) "only makes certain property includible in the estate; it does not
affect the valuation of such property for estate tax purposes").
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trast to an installment sale or private annuity arrangement. 46 A
buy-sell agreement based on a fixed or formula price also facili-
tates orderly succession of ownership in a family held business by
establishing a funding mechanism, such as life insurance, for the
buy-out price. Although a buy-sell agreement potentially freezes
appreciation uniformly for all of the parties, it may provide dispa-
rate economic benefits if the parties have different actuarial life
expectancies or if one of the parties is seriously ill.247 Under prior
law, a buy-sell agreement that fixed the purchase price by refer-
ence to a dollar amount or formula was sufficient to limit the value
included in the seller's gross estate to the stated purchase price if
the fixed or formula price was reasonable at the outset and no sub-
stantial changes occurred in the nature of the business.248
If section 2036(c) applies, however, the fair market value of the
decedent's stock will be determined for estate tax purposes with-
out regard to any restrictions under the agreement.2 49 A strict
reading of the statute raised concerns that the purchase price
under the buy-sell agreement would have to be determined by ap-
praisal of the value of property at the time of the sale. Recognizing
that one of the primary purposes of a buy-sell agreement may be
to "avoid the expense and administrative difficulties involved in an
appraisal of the property," the Service has indicated that the
purchase price may be determined by a formula that meets certain
conditions.250 The formula must be based on "currently acceptable
valuation techniques" that can be reasonably expected to approxi-
246. See Solberg, Buy-Sell Agreements Can "Freeze" Asset Values and in Some Cases
Make Them Disappear, 59 TAxEs 437 (1981).
247. The execution of a buy-sell agreement generally does not give rise to a taxable gift
because the parties receive adequate and full consideration through their mutual promises.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1); see also Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181,
188 (1958) (disregarding terminal illness of one of the parties). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-
10-004 (Nov. 21, 1986) (disregarding buy-sell agreement because of decedent's ill health and
lack of mutuality).
248. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h); see also St. Louis County Bank v. United States, 674
F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982); Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 334-35 (1989);
Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32, 39-42 (1977).
249. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 427. As drafted, the statute could conceiv-
ably apply to a buy-sell agreement between unrelated parties subject to the exception for
bona fide sales. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
250. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 13.
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mate fair market value at the time of the sale.251 A good faith buy-
sell agreement will thus come within the safe harbor if it adopts a
formula "generally recognized as suitable to the valuation of the
type of property involved and acceptable in arm's length negotia-
tions" at the time the buy-sell agreement is undertaken. 52 For ex-
ample, a formula based on book value may be an acceptable valua-
tion technique for valuing the incidental tangible property of a
service business, but such a formula cannot be reasonably expected
to approximate the fair market value of an enterprise involving
real property held for investment purposes. 253 For this purpose, a
bona fide buy-sell agreement between persons who are not mem-
bers of the same family will come within the safe harbor. 54
C. Deemed Gift Treatment
The purpose of section 2036(c) as originally enacted was to back-
stop the estate tax by triggering inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate of the date-of-death value of the transferred property if the
transferor held the retained interest until death. Under the reten-
tion provisions generally, the rationale for estate tax inclusion is
that a transfer with retained enjoyment of property is a substitute
for a testamentary transfer. Because of the nontestamentary na-
ture of the transfer, literal adherence to this purpose would render
the retention provisions inoperative if the retained interest is
transferred more than three years before death. The valuation dif-
ficulties addressed by section 2036(c), however, are distinct from
the concern that a transfer with retained enjoyment is a substitute
for a testamentary transfer. In order to backstop this valuation
function, the 1988 version of section 2036(c) added a new deemed




253. Id. at exs. 26-27. The formula must also reflect reasonable standards for valuing
goodwill. See id. at ex. 27.
254. Id. at 13.
255. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4).
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1. General
Under section 2036(c)(4), a subsequent transfer of either the
transferred or retained interest may result in a proportionate
deemed gift of the appreciation property at the time of such trans-
fer.256 If section 2036(c)(4) applies, the original transferor is
treated as making a gift of property at the time of the subsequent
disposition in an amount equal to the "paragraph (1) inclusion":
the amount that would have been drawn back into the original
transferor's gross estate under section 2036(c) had he died at that
time. 57 The amount of the paragraph (1) inclusion is reduced by
the amount, if any, of the taxable gift resulting from the initial
disproportionate transfer of the appreciation property.2 58 Thus, the
amount of the deemed gift will generally be equal to the growth in
value of the appreciation property during the time between the ini-
tial disproportionate transfer and the deemed gift.259 The statute
also specifically provides that the amount of the deemed gift will
be reduced to reflect prior deemed gifts and any right of recovery
under section 2207B.26 °
Unlike the right of recovery with respect to estate taxes paid, the
transferor apparently may not waive the right of recovery with re-
spect to gift taxes paid. The Conference Report indicates that the
failure of the original transferor to enforce the right of recovery
will result in a taxable gift when such right ceases to be enforcea-
ble.21 The right of recovery runs against the "original transferee,"
defined as the person receiving property in a disproportionate
transfer to which section 2036(c)(1) applies, or any member of the
original transferor's family to whom such property is subsequently
256. Id. New § 2036(c)(4) should not be confused with the provision of the original stat-
ute bearing the same paragraph number but dealing with the three-year rule. See 1988 Act,
§ 3031(h)(2), 102 Stat. at 3639 (regarding effective date of amendment).
257. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(A), (D)(iii). The "paragraph (1) inclusion" is determined without
regard to §§ 2032 (alternate valuation date) and 2032A (special valuation rules for farmland
and closely held business realty). Id. § 2036(c)(4)(D)(iii).
258. Id. This adjustment is necessary because § 2001(b) does not apply to "wash out" the
prior gift.
259. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1337.
260. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(A).
261. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2207A-
1(a), 49 Fed. Reg. 21363 (1984).
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transferred. 62 The right of recovery converts the gift into a net gift
by subtracting the amount of the gift tax from the value of the
gift.263
The deemed gift treatment, coupled with the right of recovery
for gift taxes paid, gives the original transferor the ability to trig-
ger substantial gift tax liability on the part of the original trans-
feree. For example, assume that A gives away all of the common
stock to B, who is A's child, while retaining preferred stock. Under
B's management, the company prospers and the value of the com-
mon stock increases greatly. If relations between A and B become
strained, A can transfer his preferred stock to a third party,
thereby triggering a deemed gift of the common stock to B, who
must ultimately bear the gift tax liability.2 6 4
To the extent that a deemed gift occurs under section 2036(c)(4),
the appreciation property will not be subject to inclusion in the
original transferor's gross estate under sections 2036(a) or
2035(d)(2). 65 The original transferor's gross estate will be in-
creased, however, by the gift tax attributable to deemed gifts
within three years of the original transferor's death.266 The deemed
gift rule avoids difficult tracing problems when subsequent trans-
fers occur, 67 but may also trigger more burdensome tax conse-
quences than if the retained interest were held until death. The
lower effective transfer tax rates on deemed gifts may be out-
weighed by the loss of the section 1014 basis step-up for income
262. See I.R.C. §§ 2036(c)(4)(D)(ii), 2207B(b). If more than one original transferee exists,
the deemed donee is presumably the original transferee, whose subsequent transfer of the
appreciation property triggers § 2036(c)(4). The statutory approach is consistent with the
underlying notion of treating the "section 2036(c)(4) transfer as the act which finally com-
pletes the gift of the original growth interest." Miller, supra note 9, at 1338 n.27.
263. If the right of recovery attributable to the gift tax exceeds the original transferor's
basis in the property, the original transferor will recognize gain on the excess of the gift tax
over his basis. See Diedrich v. United States, 457 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1982).
264. See Keydel, supra note 9, at 14. If A retains the preferred stock, B may be liable for
a pro rata share of the estate taxes attributable to the transferred common stock at A's
death, or at the death of A's spouse if A transfers the preferred stock to his spouse in a
nontaxable transfer.
265. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(B).
266. See id. § 2035(c); 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 420.
267. See Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Estate Tax, 65
MIcH. L. REV. 105, 138-41 (1966).
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tax purposes and the unavailability of the estate tax provisions
favoring closely held businesses.26
2. Triggering events
Deemed gift treatment may be triggered by three types of dispo-
sitions: (i) the original transferee's transfer of the appreciation
property to a nonfamily member; (ii) the original transferor's
transfer of the retained interest, other than to a spouse in a non-
taxable transfer; or (iii) the original transferee's transfer of the ap-
preciation property back to the original transferor. If the original
transferee subsequently transfers the appreciation property to a
member of the original transferor's family, other than the original
transferor, deemed gift treatment is postponed until the property
is retransferred to a person who is not a member of the original
transferor's family.269 For example, if a parent transfers common
stock to a child while retaining the preferred stock, and the child
subsequently transfers the common stock to the transferor's
grandchild, a deemed gift would occur only when the grandchild
transfers the common stock to a nonfamily member.7 0
If a deemed gift occurs because the original transferee retrans-
fers the appreciation property to the original transferor, the
amount of the deemed gift is reduced by the excess of the fair mar-
ket value of the transferred property over any consideration paid
by the original transferor for such property. 7 1 This rule is in-
tended to ensure that no deemed gift results to the extent that the
returned property increases the original transferor's gross estate. 272
For example, assume that the original transferee transfers the ap-
preciation property back to the original transferor for no consider-
268. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6166 (permitting installment treatment of estate tax attributable to
a closely held business); id. § 2032A (permitting valuation of farmland and closely held
business realty at its use value); see also id. § 303 (permitting exchange treatment for a
death-time redemption of certain closely held business interests).
269. See id. § 2036(c)(4)(A)(ii).
270. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 420.
271. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(C).
272. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75. Technically, the deemed gift rule
of § 2036(c)(4)(A) is phrased in terms of transfers to persons other than members of the
original transferor's family. A subsequent transfer of the appreciation property to the origi-
nal transferor might thus appear to be outside the deemed gift rule but for the specific rule
of § 2036(c)(4)(C).
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ation. Although the retransfer would trigger a deemed gift under
section 2036(c)(4), the amount of the deemed gift would be zero."'
If the original transferor or original transferee transfers only a
portion of either the retained or transferred interests, only a pro-
portionate amount of the value of the appreciation property is sub-
ject to deemed gift treatment. The value of the remaining portion
of the appreciation property continues to be subject to inclusion in
the original transferor's gross estate. For example, assume that an
individual transfers all of his common stock to a family member,
while retaining all of the preferred stock. A subsequent transfer of
one half of the preferred stock will trigger a deemed gift of one
half of the value of the common stock at the time of the transfer." 4
Only the value of the remaining half of the common stock will be
includible in the transferor's gross estate under section 2036(c).
3. Restoration of proportionality
A subsequent transfer of the retained interest gives rise to
deemed gift treatment only to the extent that the subsequent
transfer restores proportionality. 7 5 For example, assume that an
individual owning 80% of the common and preferred stock of a
corporation initially transfers 40% of the common stock, and sub-
sequently transfers half of his remaining common stock and half of
his preferred stock. The subsequent transfer of 40% of the pre-
ferred stock apparently restores proportionality with respect to the
40% of the common stock previously transferred, thus triggering a
deemed gift equal to 40% of the value of the common stock, less
the amount reported as a gift at the time of the original transfer
and any right of recovery. The additional 20% of the common
stock, however, would be includible in the transferor's gross estate
at its value as of the time of the transferor's death.
The operation of the proportionality rule is less certain if the
transfer of the preferred stock precedes the transfer of the com-
mon stock. In the above example, assume instead that the trans-
273. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1337..
274. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 419.
275. Id. Technically, this result is reached under the statute by limiting the amount of
the deemed gift to the "paragraph (1) inclusion (or proportionate amount thereof)." See
I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(A)(ii).
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feror initially transfers 40% of the preferred stock and subse-
quently transfers 60% of the common stock. Assuming one views
the transfers in the aggregate, the result should be the same as in
the previous example because the transferor has merely "post-
poned" the freeze. Accordingly, only 20% of the common stock
should be drawn back into the transferor's gross estate. If one dis-
regards the prior transfer of the preferred stock, however, 60% of
the common stock would be drawn back under section 2036(c). Un-
til Congress amends the statute to address this situation, the regu-
lations should provide clarification to avoid disparate treatment
arising from the order of transfers.17 6
The legislative history also indicates that deemed gift treatment
applies only if a subsequent transfer "restores proportionality with
respect to all classes of interests that gave rise to the application of
section 2036(c). 27 For example, if the transferor gives away all of
the common stock, while retaining two classes of preferred stock, a
deemed gift will result only to the extent that the transferor subse-
quently transfers a proportionate amount of each class of preferred
stock. According to the example in the legislative history, a subse-
quent transfer of 25% of one class and 75% of the other class of
preferred stock would result in a deemed gift of only the 25% of
the common stock with respect to which proportionality was re-
stored.7 s The example does not indicate why the two classes of
preferred stock cannot be combined in appropriate circumstances
to determine the portion of the common stock subject to deemed
gift treatment. For example, if the two classes of preferred stock
were equal in value and dividend rights, then the subsequent
transfer would in effect remove 50% of the total retained interest
and could be reasonably treated as triggering a deemed gift of 50%
of the common stock under section 2036(c)(4).
D. Terminations and Lapses
The 1988 Act provides that terminations, lapses or other changes
in any interest in the enterprise "shall be treated as transfers,"
276. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1440.
277. 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 419.
278. Id. at 419-20.
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triggering application of section 2036(c)(4).119 This provision is in-
tended to cure the gap in the statute as originally enacted in cases
in which the original transferor's interest terminates or lapses
more than three years before death. s0 For example, the older gen-
eration might transfer common stock to the younger generation
while retaining convertible preferred stock that, by its terms,
would be automatically converted after ten years into common
stock equal in value to the preferred stock.281 If the transferor sur-
vived beyond the ten-year period, the original version of section
2036(c) apparently became inoperative.28 2 Alternatively, the older
generation could transfer a limited partnership interest to the
younger generation while retaining a general partnership interest.
If the partnership agreement provided that the partnership would
terminate at the end of ten years, the value of the limited partner-
ship interest would not be includible in the transferor's gross es-
tate if he survived the ten-year period.
The treatment of terminations and lapses as transfers expands
considerably the scope of the original statute. Although the statute
is silent concerning partial terminations, the legislative history in-
dicates that "[w]here the termination occurs gradually over time,
the deemed gift occurs when the interest completely termi-
nates. ' 283 In the case of a debt obligation, for example, the deemed
gift would occur when debt is fully retired, rather than as each
payment is made.284 The regulations should clarify that a similar
rule applies when a preferred shareholder has a right to convert
preferred stock into common stock. They should treat the conver-
sion as a termination of the retained interest and disregard the
failure of the preferred shareholder to exercise the conversion priv-
ilege in any prior year.2 5 By analogy, if a person transfers a part-
279. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(D)(iv).
280. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1442.
282. If the transferor died within three years after termination of the retained interest, it
was unclear whether § 2036(c) was applicable. Arguably, the termination would not consti-
tute a "transfer" of the retained interest for purposes of the three-year rule. See id. at 1438.
283. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 420.
284. See id.
285. See id. Nonexercise of a conversion privilege or waiver of noncumulative dividend
payments will merely increase the value of the common stock that is likely to be includible
in the transferor's gross estate.
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nership interest with a disproportionate right to appreciation, a
deemed gift should occur to the extent that a partnership "flip"
causes a shift in partnership allocations that restores proportional-
ity.2 86 If the original transferor or transferee retains a direct or in-
direct interest in the transferred property, deemed gift treatment
is inapplicable.28 7 The original transferor thus cannot accelerate
the taxable event, for example, by transferring the retained inter-
est to a wholly owned holding company.288
For property transferred before December 18, 1987, the 1988 Act
clarifies that for purposes of section 2036(c) no subsequent transfer
will be treated as having occurred because of any failure to exercise
conversion or other rights, or because of any failure to pay divi-
dends.289 This provision reinforces the grandfather treatment for
transfers prior to December 18, 1987, under the original statute,
but does not preclude periodic imputed gift treatment under Dick-
man principles. If a pre-December 18, 1987, freeze is left in place,
any additional subsequent transfer of an interest in the enterprise
may be subject to section 2036(C). 290 In addition, the transitional
rules in the 1988 Act provide for a "correction period," from De-
cember 18, 1987, through December 31, 1989, for remedying any
transaction that would otherwise be subject to section 2036(c). 291
286. Id.
287. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(E).
288. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 421. If the holding company is wholly
owned by the original transferee, the transfer would trigger application of § 2036(c)(4) be-
cause the original transferor has severed his direct ownership. See id.
289. See 1988 Act, § 3031(h)(5), 102 Stat. at 3640 (regarding effective dates).
290. See Dees, supra note 9, at 886. If a transfer occurs after December 17, 1987, the
method of measuring preexisting interests for purposes of the disproportionality test is un-
clear. See Estate Freezes and IRC Sec. 2036(c), supra note 7, at 1439-40.
291. See 1988 Act, § 3031(h)(4), 102 Stat. at 3639:
CORRECTION PERIOD.-If section 2036(c)(1) of the 1986 Code would (but
for this paragraph) apply to any interest arising from a transaction entered
into during the period beginning after December 17, 1987, and ending before
January 1, 1990, such section shall not apply to such interest if-
(A) during such period, such actions are taken as are necessary to have such
section 2036(c)(1) not apply to such transaction (and any such interest),
or
(B) the original transferor and his spouse on January 1, 1990 (or, if earlier,
the date of the original transferor's death), do not hold any interest in
the enterprise involved.
Id.; see also I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 16.
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E. Other Estate Planning Techniques
The Service has confirmed that section 2036(c) may apply to a
wide range of estate planning techniques, including sales of re-
mainder interests, split-interest purchases, grantor retained income
trusts (GRITs), private annuities and installment sales. Although
the Service's announcement clarifies the operation of the statute in
some of these areas, numerous issues remain unresolved.
1. Remainder-interest sales
Prior to enactment of section 2036(c), a sale of a remainder in-
terest for less than adequate and full consideration triggered inclu-
sion under section 2036(a). 92 Although Congress did not amend
section 2036(a), sales of remainder interests are now apparently
governed by the more specific provisions of section 2036(c), which
treat a transaction of this kind as a disproportionate transfer be-
cause it eliminates the transferor's right to potential appreciation.
The transferred interest not only has a disproportionate potential
for appreciation, but will appreciate by virtue of the mere passage
of time. Under the original version of section 2036(c), a technical
argument might have precluded operation of the statute, however,
because the income interest terminated at the transferor's death.
The present statute cures this technical problem by providing that
a deemed gift will result when the income interest expires. Even
though the actuarial value of the remainder interest increases
steadily with the passage of time, no deemed gift will occur until
the remainder vests.2 93
2. Split-interest purchases
The Service has also taken the position that section 2036(c) ap-
plies to split-interest purchases, contrary to the view of some com-
292. Notwithstanding some case law to the contrary, the adequacy of the consideration
received should be measured against the discounted present value of the remainder interest,
not the value of the entire property. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 283-84; Lane, supra note 7,
at 301; see also Comment, Gradow v. United States: Death of Remainder Interest Sale As
An Estate Freezing Technique, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 183 (1988); cf. Gradow v. Commissioner, 11
Cl. Ct. 808 (1987).
293. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 420.
[Vol. 31:67
VALUATION FREEZES AFTER THE 1988 ACT
mentators 4 Split-interest purchases were attractive under prior
law because taxpayers could manipulate the Treasury tables for
valuing partial interests." 5 Use of the Treasury tables to value par-
tial interests is permitted, even if the expected yield is lower than
the applicable discount rate reflected in the tables." 6 Valuation of
the respective term and remainder interests under the tables un-
derstates the value of the term interest whenever the market rate
exceeds the table rate, and vice versa. If the property funded by
the split-interest purchase produces current income at less than
the table rate, the difference between the table rate and the yield
will be reflected in disproportionate appreciation in the remainder
interest that escapes the transfer tax base.297 Valuation tables offer
an open invitation to exploitation by ingenious estate planners. 98
The House amendment would have applied specifically to a
split-interest purchase if, after the purchase, the parent owned
10% or more of the voting power or income stream of the prop-
erty.29  Under the Service's interpretation of the substantial inter-
est test, however, this requirement need be met only at the mo-
ment of transfer. Moreover, an agreement that contemplates the
purchase of unidentified investment property may constitute an
294. See, e.g., Fuller & Strauss, Split Purchases May Still Be Viable After RA '87 and
TAMRA, 70 J. TAx'N 22 (1989).
295. The Treasury tables, based on an assumed 10% discount rate, are contained in
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f). The 1988 Act requires monthly adjustment of the table rate. See
I.R.C. § 7520 (requiring interest rate equal to 120% of the federal mid-term rate for the
month that includes the valuation date). The applicable factor for valuing a remainder in-
terest based on a term of years is equal to 1/(1 + i)'. in which i equals 120% of the applica-
ble federal rate and t equals the number of years in the term. I.R.S. Notice 89-24, 1989-10
I.R.B. 16; see Hastings, The Treasury Department Valuation Tables: How They Work and
How to Make Them Work for You, 46 INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch. 53 (1988).
296. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-051 (Jan. 28, 1987) (donor retained right to make the
property productive). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-42-028 (July 16, 1986) (donor lacked power
to compel investment of principal at reasonable yield).
297. An appropriate income tax rule would partially eliminate the advantages of split-
interest purchases by treating receipt of the remainder interest as a realization event. See
Dodge, supra note 3, at 288-92; Lane, supra note 7, at 307-13; see also Blum, Amortization
of a Retained Terminable Interest After Transfer of a Remainder, 62 TAXES 211 (1984);
Kwall, The Income Tax Consequences of Sales of Present Interests and Future Interests:
Distinguishing Time from Space, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1988).
298. See, e.g., Oshins, GRITS, Splits and Tidbits, TR. & EST., Mar. 1987, at 28, 44-46.
299. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 424. As the House Report noted, "the
concerns underlying section 2036(c) do not depend on whether the substantial interest ex-
ists before or after the effective transfer." Id.
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enterprise.3 00 The Service's guidance illustrates these principles in
the context of an agreement between a parent and child to
purchase a portfolio of securities for investment.30' The securities
are purchased through a brokerage account in which the parent
has a life estate and the child has a remainder interest. The parent
and child furnish consideration of $75 and $25, respectively, equal
to the fair market value of their interests. In the example, the Ser-
vice concludes that, "[t]hrough the implementation of the agree-
ment," the parent has in effect transferred an interest in 75% of
the potential appreciation in the securities in exchange for the
child's 25% interest in the income from the securities. Accordingly,
the parent has made a disproportionate transfer because the par-
ent's share of the potential appreciation is greater before the trans-
fer (100%/100%) than after (0%/100%).
3. GRITs
The 1988 Act creates a special rule for certain grantor retained
income trusts (GRITs) having a term of ten years or less. Under
the House version of the 1988 Act, terminating a GRIT would have
triggered a deemed gift under the provisions of section 2036(c)(4)
concerning lapse or termination of retained interests.302 The Con-
ference Committee adopted the House provision concerning lapses
or terminations, but added a special rule contained in new section
2036(c)(6), exempting certain GRITs from the operation of the
statute. Under section 2036(c)(6), retention of a "qualified trust in-
come interest" is disregarded, and the transferor is treated as con-
tinuing to own the trust property as long as the qualified trust in-
come interest continues. Section 2036(c)(6) defines a "qualified
trust income interest" as a right to receive amounts determined
solely by reference to the income from trust property if (i) such
right is for a period not exceeding ten years, (ii) the income benefi-
ciary transferred the property to the trust, and (iii) the income
beneficiary is not a trustee of the trust.303
300. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
301. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 10, ex. 16; see also id. at 11, ex. 19.
302. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 420.
303. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(6)(B).
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The treatment of the initial transfer to the GRIT as a completed
gift is not affected, however, for purposes of section 2511. As a re-
sult, the grantor is treated as having made a gift equal to the value
of the remainder interest, as determined under the Treasury ta-
bles, at the time of the initial transfer. The GRIT exception per-
mits the grantor to achieve substantial gift tax savings by "leverag-
ing" his unified credit.0 4 The effect is even more pronounced if the
grantor is permitted to reduce the taxable gift by the value of a
contingent reversion or general power of appointment.3 05 A literal
reading of the statute does not suggest that a qualified trust in-
come interest is the only interest that the grantor may retain. The
Service has indicated, however, that the GRIT exception is gener-
ally unavailable if the grantor retains a contingent reversion or
general power of appointment with respect to trust principal, un-
less the value of the prohibited interest is "insubstantial" relative
to the value of the retained income interest.30 6
The special rule exempting GRITs represents a departure from
the underlying purpose of the statute. The Conference Committee
was apparently concerned that taxpayers might exploit this loop-
hole to accomplish an indirect freeze by transferring preferred
stock to a GRIT, while giving away the common stock to family
members. In this situation, the Conference Report warns that the
preferred stock transferred to a GRIT will be treated as retained
by the transferor during the GRIT's term, and termination of the
GRIT will give rise to a deemed taxable gift equal to the then cur-
rent value of the transferred common stock.30 7 The transaction as a
whole, but not the GRIT as such, will thus be subject to section
304. For example, assuming an interest rate of 10% under the Treasury tables, the pre-
sent value of a 10-year income interest is approximately 61.44% of the value of the entire
property subject to the income interest. Given a unified credit of $600,000, the maximum
amount that could be transferred to a statutory GRIT, without triggering a taxable gift, is
approximately $1,556,000.
305. See Oshins, supra note 298, at 28-29; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-27-031 (Apr. 3, 1987)
(gift tax value of contingent remainder reduced in accordance with Table LN contained in
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7).
306. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 11-12. For this purpose, the value of the rever-
sion or general power of appointment is considered insubstantial if it does not exceed 25%
of the value of the retained income interest, determined without regard to the value of the
reversion or power. Id. at ex. 25.
307. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75.
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2036(c) just as if the preferred stock had never been transferred to
the GRIT. If the grantor places his entire stock interest, or a pro-
portionate share of his entire interest, in a qualifying GRIT, how-
ever, the transaction falls outside the statute.308 Despite the statu-
tory exemption for GRITs under section 2036(c), the grantor may
nevertheless be treated as making periodic annual gifts under
Dickman principles if the yield on the trust property is excessively
low. 309
4. Annuities
The Conference Report clarifies that a trust in which the trans-
feror retains an annuity interest is not treated as a qualified in-
come trust.310 The fixed annuity payment is not considered an
amount determined solely by reference to the income from the
trust property. Accordingly, section 2036(c) may apply to a grantor
retained annuity trust (GRAT) or a private annuity sale.311 In a
private annuity sale, one person, the annuitant, sells property to
another, the obligor, in exchange for the obligor's unsecured prom-
ise to make specified payments to the annuitant during the annui-
tant's life.31 2 If the actuarial value of the annuity, valued under the
Treasury tables, is equal to or exceeds the value of the transferred
property, the annuity sale does not give rise to a taxable gift by the
annuitant.31 3 The principal income tax disadvantage of such a pri-
308. Section 2036(c)(6) apparently represents the exclusive safe harbor for GRITs. For
example, a transfer of cash or marketable securities to a nonqualifying GRIT will trigger§ 2036(c) because the GRIT itself is viewed as the "enterprise."
309. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 88-23-030 (Mar. 8, 1988); 88-23-029 (Mar. 8, 1988); 88-15-
005 (Jan. 7, 1988); 88-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1987); 88-05-029 (Nov. 9, 1987); 88-01-008 (Oct. 7,
1987).
310. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 74 n.1.
311. Depending on how the transaction is structured, a transfer to a trust may be either a
GRAT or a private annuity. Compare Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824, 828-29 (9th
Cir. 1975) (finding taxpayer's arrangement to be a GRAT) with LaFargue v. Commissioner,
689 F.2d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding taxpayer's argument that arrangement was
private annuity transaction).
312. Under the Treasury tables, the present value of an annuity is determined by multi-
plying the "annuity factor" for a term by the amount of the annuity. The annuity factor is
equal to (income factor/i), in which i equals the applicable interest rate and the income
factor is equal to (1 - the remainder factor). See I.R.S. Notice 89-24, 1989-10 I.R.B. 16.
313. See Lane, supra note 7, at 293-94; see also LaFargue v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M.
(CCH) 839, 842 (1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1986); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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vate annuity arrangement is that all of the obligor's payments are
treated as part of the purchase price of the property and a nonde-
ductible "annuity amount." '314 From the annuitant's perspective,
each payment is divided actuarially into a return of capital, capital
gain and an annuity feature. 315
A sale of property to a family member in exchange for an annu-
ity may be abusive if the discount rate used in valuing the annuity
promise is low relative to the actual rate of return on the trans-
ferred property, allowing the related purchaser to fund the annuity
payments entirely from the property's income. Under the current
Treasury tables, this potential abuse may be relatively insignificant
because the transferred property will seldom produce a yield sub-
stantially in excess of the assumed discount rate.1 6 More signifi-
cantly, a private annuity may avoid transfer taxes if the annuitant
dies prematurely, with the result that his gross estate is not replen-
ished by the expected payments under the annuity contract. 17
Therefore, a "hindsight" approach to valuation of annuities may
be appropriate to remedy valuation uncertainties.318
5. Installment sales
The Service has also confirmed that installment sales are within
the scope of section 2036(c).3 1 9 Unlike an annuity, the right to re-
ceive payments under an installment obligation usually does not
lapse at death. The value of the property sold will be replaced in
the seller's gross estate by the value of the note or proceeds
thereof. If the installment note bears an inadequate rate of inter-
314. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352; see also Zaritsky, Bits and Pieces: Sales
of Remainder Interests and Split Purchases, 38 MAJOR TAX PLAN ch. 16, at 16-25 (1986).
315. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; see also Leimberg & McDaniel, The Pri-
vate Annuity Time Grab Revisited, J. Am. Soc. CLU, Mar. 1985, at 34; Zaritsky, supra note
314, at 16-25.
316. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 294. A higher assumed interest rate reduces the value of
an annuity interest and increases the value of an income interest. See Hastings, supra note
295, at 53-8.
317. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 295. The Service has ruled that the Treasury valuation
tables may be used except in cases in which the annuitant's death is "clearly imminent."
Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, 195.
318. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 295-96.
319. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 5.
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est, a taxable gift may result under section 7872.320 Other problems
may arise if the installment note includes a self-cancelling feature.
In Estate of Moss v. Commissioner,2' an installment note with a
self-cancellation feature was held not to be includible in the dece-
dent's gross estate because the cancellation feature was "bargained
for" in an arm's length transaction.32 2 In the family context, it will
usually be difficult to prove that adequate and full consideration
was paid for the cancellation clause.323 A self-cancelling note is ar-
guably similar to voting rights or other interests that lapse at the
transferor's death. A broad interpretation of section 2036(c) there-
fore may be justified to prevent transfer-tax avoidance through
self-cancelling rights or other forms of disappearing value.
6. Life insurance
Congress specifically authorized the Treasury to address the
treatment of life insurance trusts and similar arrangements.3 24 The
Service, however, has determined that life insurance should be
generally excluded from the scope of section 2036(c) because sec-
tion 2042 addresses specifically the estate tax treatment of life in-
surance, and the definition of a life insurance contract in section
7702 reflects a legislative determination of whether the personal or
investment aspects of a contract predominate.3 25 Nevertheless, a
life insurance trust may be treated as an enterprise to the extent
the trust is funded with cash in excess of the amount reasonably
necessary to fund insurance premiums. 26
320. See, e.g., Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988) (taxpayer entitled to
rely on 6% safe harbor rate of former § 483 for gift tax purposes); see also Tech. Adv. Mem.
87-01-002 (Sept. 19, 1986) (treatment before § 7872).
321. 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), acq. in result, 1981-2 C.B. 2.
322. Id. at 1246-47. See generally Banoff & Hartz, It's No Sin to SCIN! A Reply to Pro-
fessor Blum on Self-Cancelling Installment Notes, 60 TAXES 187 (1982); Blum, Self-Cancel-
ling Installment Notes-The New SCIN Game?, 60 TAXES 183 (1982).
323. If the obligation has a term in excess of the seller's life expectancy, a self-cancelling
note may be treated as a private annuity rather than an installment sale. See Rev. Rul. 86-
72, 1986-1 C.B. 253; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-06-002 (Sept. 16, 1988); Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,503 (June 28, 1985).
324. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 428; 1988 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at
531; see also Dees, supra note 9, at 888-89.
325. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 6 & n.14; see I.R.C. §§ 2042, 7702.
326. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 7-8, ex. 7 & n.18.
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IV. CURBING DISPROPORTIONALITY: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A. Overview
Although section 2036(c) equates retained discretionary controls
with abusive estate freezes, the statute fails to provide an accurate
measure of the disproportionality that constitutes the perceived
abuse. A disproportionate shift in value will occur only to the ex-
tent that the transferor fails to insist on an adequate return on his
contributed capital or future services. If the transfer tax base in-
cludes the shifted value, the purpose of section 2036(c) should be
adequately served. In other areas involving intrafamily transac-
tions, Congress has adopted a "wait-and-see" approach to deter-
mine whether value has actually shifted.
Under the existing statute, the proportional exclusion rule offers
a rough measurement of disproportionate shifts in value based on
the assumption that the transferred property appreciates or depre-
ciates at the same rate as the retained interest. This assumption
disregards the characteristics of the separate property interests
that might justify differing rates of return in the hands of third
parties in order to forestall manipulation of such characteristics in
the context of intrafamily transfers. Valuation problems are also
rendered less intractable if the fragmented interests are treated as
undivided fractional interests in a single unit of property. Even if
fragmented interests are thus reconstituted, however, astute plan-
ners still will be able to take advantage of valuation uncertainties
concerning the value of the entire property. Because the excludible
portion of the transferred property is determined as a constant
fraction of the entire property, any initial undervaluation of the
property as a whole will result in the exclusion of a correspond-
ingly larger portion of the transferred property.
The proportional exclusion rule, although relatively easy to for-
mulate and administer, does not always provide an accurate mea-
sure of the shifted value and sometimes produces arbitrary and
harsh results. A better model can be derived from the family part-
nership rules of section 704(e), which permit the Service to disre-
gard allocations of partnership income between family members
when such allocations fail to reflect economic reality. These rules
provide for reallocation of the distributive share allocable to a do-
nee partner if the donor partner fails to receive adequate compen-
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sation for his services, or the distributive share allocated to the
donee's capital is proportionately greater than the distributive
share allocated to the donor's capital.2 7 In the transfer tax con-
text, the proposed section 704(e) approach would apportion the fu-
ture income stream of the business, including any appreciation in
assets of the business, in proportion to the relative capital interests
and services of the transferor and transferee. To the extent that
the value reallocated to the transferor exceeded the value of the
transferor's actual interest, determined as of the time the capital
shift is treated as complete, the excess value would be treated as
an additional transfer to the transferee. The portion of the future
income stream and appreciation properly allocable to the trans-
feree's capital or services would be respected, and accordingly
would not be drawn back into the transferor's gross estate.
Existing section 704(e) essentially applies assignment of income
principles and provides a nonexclusive safe harbor to determine
when a person will be considered a partner in a partnership for tax
purposes.3 8 Thus, if a person holds an interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, the person
will be recognized as a partner for tax purposes, regardless of
whether the partnership interest was acquired by gift or by
purchase.3 29 If a partnership interest is purchased directly from a
family member, however, the seller and purchaser are generally
treated as donor and donee, thus triggering the section 704(e) real-
location rules.330 Nevertheless, the form of the purchase will be
respected and the reallocation rules will not be triggered if the
purchase has the usual characteristics of an arm's length transac-
327. See I.R.C. § 704(e).
328. See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 14.01 (1977 & Supp. 1988). Prior to enactment of § 704(e), whether a family
partnership arrangement would be respected for tax purposes was uncertain. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949) (facts-and-circumstances test).
329. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii); see also Banoff, Long, Steele & Smith, Family
Partnerships: Capital as a Material Income-Producing Factor, 37 TAx LAW. 275, 277
(1984).
330. Section 704(e)(3) provides that "an interest purchased by one member of a family
from another shall be considered to be created by gift from the seller, and the fair market
value of the purchased interest shall be considered to be donated capital." See Tress. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(e)(4)(i), (ii)(b); W. MCKEE, supra note 328, 14.0313].
[Vol. 31:67
VALUATION FREEZES AFTER THE 1988 ACT
tion 31 The existing section 704(e) reallocation rules address only
the income tax consequences of partnership allocations.3 2 Under
present law, these rules apparently have no estate or gift tax conse-
quences. Indeed, the section 704(e) rules may actually facilitate es-
tate planning objectives because the income tax paid on the reallo-
cated income reduces the donor's gross estate.33
The section 704(e) approach would eliminate the artificial dis-
tinction under the proportional exclusion rule depending on
whether the transferee acquires his interest by purchase or by gift.
The transferee's initial capital account would be credited with the
fair market value of any consideration paid to the transferor as
well as the gift tax value of any donated capital received from the
transferor and treated as a completed gift. In other words, a pro-
portionate share of the future income and appreciation attributa-
ble to donated capital could be removed from the transferor's es-
tate at the cost of a current gift tax. Only the post-transfer'
appreciation allocated to the transferee's capital account in excess
of this proportionate share would be reallocated to the transferor
and included in his transfer tax base. The reallocated value would
be determined under a yield-based approach to reflect the extent
to which the transacation gives rise to a disguised capital shift.
The yield-based approach is superior to the proportional exclusion
rule because it permits more accurate measurement of the shifted
capital and is responsive to changes in the ratio of donated and
retained capital subsequent to the initial transfer.
B. Timing and Valuation of Gifts
One objection to the section 704(e) approach is that it would
preserve the benefits of lifetime giving despite the discretionary
controls retained by the donor. To the extent that existing law
treats completed lifetime transfers more leniently than transfers
occurring at death, the problem of when a transfer is deemed com-
331. See Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(4)(ii).
332. Whether special allocations of partnership gains and losses are subject to the
§ 704(e) regulations is unclear if such allocations have "substantial economic effect" under
the § 704(b) regulations. See W. McKEE, supra note 328, 1 14.05[1] [c]; Elias, supra note 5,
at 59-60. The § 704(e) regulations refer only to reallocations of partnership "income." See
Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(i)(b).
333. See Elias, supra note 5, at 61; Nelson, supra note 5, at 35.
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plete has considerable importance. Although estate and gift tax
rates have nominally been unified since 1976, the gift tax base is
"tax-exclusive" while the estate tax base is "tax-inclusive. ' 34 The
systematic exclusion of the gift taxes from the gift tax base means
that a completed lifetime transfer is generally taxed at a lower ef-
fective rate than a comparable transfer at death.3 35 This disparity
would be largely eliminated if the gift tax were imposed on a tax-
inclusive base. 36
If the gift and estate tax bases were fully unified, the distinction
between lifetime gifts and transfers at death would lose much of its
significance for transfer tax purposes. 31 In effect, the gift tax paid
on a lifetime transfer would represent a full prepayment of the es-
tate tax that would have been incurred had the transferor retained
the property until death.3 8 Indeed, under the ALI proposals for
334. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2001-2010, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
Prior to the 1976 Act, the gift tax was imposed on a separate tax base at graduated rates
lower than the estate tax rates. The unification of the transfer tax rates (but not the trans-
fer tax bases) under the 1976 Act prevents taxpayers fromttaking advantage of two separate
sets of graduated transfer tax brackets. Nevertheless, as under prior law, the gift tax is
imposed on the net amount transferred, while the estate tax is imposed on the amount
transferred grossed up by the amount of the estate tax. Under the 1987 Act, the benefits of
the unified credit and graduated estate and gift tax rates are phased out for estates exceed-
ing $10 million. See I.R.C. § 2001(c); 1987 Act, § 10401, 101 Stat. at 1330-430 to 1330-431.
335. The effective gift tax rate will equal t/(1 + t) in which t is the effective estate tax
rate. See Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1575,
1583 n.25 (1979) (deriving formula). At a 50% rate, a gift of $66.67 will generate a tax of
$33.33. Expressed as a percentage of the gross transfer, i.e., the gift plus the gift tax in-
curred, the effective gift tax rate is 33.33%.
336. For proposals on unification of the gift and estate tax base, see, e.g., HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REFORM
STUDIES AND PROPOSALS-UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT 351-87 (Comm. Print
1969); 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 374-83 (1984). Sec-
tion 2035 requires reinclusion of the gift tax on taxable gifts made within three years of
death. See I.R.C. § 2035.
337. See Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 500-01 (1987) (demonstrat-
ing that under certain conditions deferral or acceleration of a tax will not affect its present
value); see also Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on
Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653, 654-55 (1988).
338. See Warren, supra note 337, at 500-01. The gross gift is equal to A/(1 - t), in which
A is the net gift and t is the tax-exclusive rate. For example, a net gift of $30 would be taxed
as a gross gift of $50 if t equals 40%. The same result could be achieved by grossing up the
rate, rather than the gift. The tax-inclusive rate will equal t/(1 - t) in which t is the tax-
exclusive rate. Thus, a 40% tax-exclusive rate is equivalent to a 66.67% tax-inclusive rate.
See id.; C. SHouP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 16-17 (1966) (gross-up formula).
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restructuring the transfer tax system, a lifetime gift would be
treated as complete unless the transferor retained control over en-
joyment of the property or retained the ability to revest the prop-
erty in himself."3 9 As the ALI report acknowledges, this "easy-to-
complete" rule would "allow a transferor to retain many strings on
a transfer and nevertheless get the value of the future growth out
from under transfer taxation, as long as the strings do not permit
the transferor to pull the property back to himself.
3 40
Even if the transfer tax base were unified, however, administra-
tive considerations might favor a "hard-to-complete" rule in cases
in which the transferor's retained rights make it difficult to ascer-
tain the value of the transferred property at the time of the gift.
341
Under a hard-to-complete rule, there would be no need to deter-
mine the exact value of the transferred interest at the time of the
initial transfer.342 Instead, the transaction would be held open until
the transferor died or relinquished the retained rights and the
value of the transferred property could be ascertained more easily.
By measuring the aggregate net wealth transfer only when the
transferor relinquishes retained powers, the hard-to-complete rule
eliminates the uncertainty of a premature valuation and thereby
avoids the inevitable subsequent adjustments necessary to correct
the inaccuracies of a premature valuation.343 Deferring the taxable
event also would neutralize to some extent the "bracket" advan-
tage attributable to the progressive rate structure and unified
credit that tends to favor early completion of transfers before the
value of the transferred property appreciates substantially.
3 44
The hard-to-complete rule would make it possible in most cases
to dispense with the reinclusion rules. This seems desirable not
only for reasons of administrative convenience but also to avoid
the potentially harsher results under the reinclusion rules as com-
339. See FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS' STUDIES 41-44, 46 (1969).
340. Id. at 42.
341. See Gutman, supra note 337, at 681. See generally Gans, Gift Tax: Valuation Diffi-
culties and Gift Completion, 58 Nom DAAtE L. REV. 493 (1983); Macris, Open Valuation
and the Completed Transfer: A Problem Area in Federal Gift Taxation, 34 TAX L. REv. 273
(1979).
342. See Gutman, supra note 337, at 676.
343. Id. at 679.
344. Id. at 655.
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pared with the normal estate tax rules.34 5 For example, assume
that a transferor has an asset worth $50 that will grow to $100 at
the time of the transferor's death.3 46 Assume, furthermore, that the
effective estate tax rate is 40%. If the transferor retains the asset
until death and it is included in his gross estate at a value of $100,
the transferor's beneficiaries will receive $60 after payment of $40
in estate taxes. Alternatively, if the transferor makes a present net
lifetime gift of $30 to his beneficiaries, incurring a gift tax of $12 at
the assumed 40% rate, the transferor's remaining $8 of assets will
grow to $16 by the time of his death. The transferred property will
grow to $60 and, if section 2036(c) applies, the full $60 will be
drawn back into the transferor's gross estate, augmenting the gross
estate to $76 ($16 plus $60). This gross estate will be subject to a
net estate tax of $18.40 ($30.40 tentative tax, less $12 gift tax
credit), which exceeds the value of the assets actually owned by
the transferor at death ($16). After payment of the additional es-
tate tax, the beneficiaries will be left with assets having a value of
$57.60, which is less than the $60 value that they would have re-
ceived if the transferor had held the transferred property until
death.
In the case of a completed lifetime gift, the payment of the gift
tax reduces the transferor's gross estate by the future value of the
assets used to pay the gift tax, resulting in estate tax savings. On
the other hand, the transferor loses the future appreciation in the
assets used to pay the gift tax. The estate tax adjustment for the
tax on adjusted taxable gifts may fail to offset the full value of this
lost appreciation because that adjustment is based on the dollar
amount of the adjusted taxable gifts. Ignoring the effects of pro-
gressive rates and the unified credit, the net tax cost of making a
345. See Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers, and the
Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 n.53 (1984); Sims, Timing Under a Unified
Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 48-49 (1984); see also Isenbergh, Further Notes
on Transfer Tax Rates, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 91 (1984).
346. If the after-tax rate at which assets are invested is assumed to be 10%, the value of
the assets will double in approximately 7.25 years. Assuming periodic compounding, the
future value is determined by multiplying the present value by (1 + r)y, in which r is the
periodic rate of appreciation and y is the number of periods between the present and the
future dates. The present (or discounted) value of a sum to be received in the future is
determined by multiplying the future value by 1/(1 + r)y. See A- ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN,
UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 180-85 (3d ed. 1972).
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completed lifetime gift of property that will be drawn back into
the transferor's gross estate is equal to the difference between (i)
the future value of the amount of gift tax on the lifetime gift and
(ii) the sum of the estate tax savings plus the gift tax on the life-
time gift.347 If the future value of the transferred property does not
exceed its present value grossed up by the amount of gift tax paid,
the reinclusion rules will not result in a more burdensome combi-
nation of estate and gift taxes because the estate tax savings
achieved by removing the amount used to pay the gift tax from the
transferor's gross estate will equal or exceed the additional tax cost
of prepaying the gift tax.345 If the value of the transferred property
was greater at the time of the transfer than at death, the adjust-
ment for prior gifts may actually exceed the estate tax attributable
to the reincluded property.
The reinclusion rules thus produce arbitrary and asymmetrical
results. Although the legislative history describes section 2036(c) as
"holding the transaction open" until the termination of the trans-
feror's retained rights, that description is misleading. 49 Under a
true open-transaction approach, the transaction would be treated
as incomplete and would not be subject to tax at the time of the
initial transfer. There would be no need for the reinclusion rules
because no transfer would be deemed to occur until the transferor
relinquished the retained controls. Much of the complexity of pre-
sent section 2036(c) with respect to gifts of appreciation property
could be eliminated by consistent application of the hard-to-com-
plete rule. Unification of the gift and estate tax rules concerning
completed transfers is essential to sound administration of the
347. Leaving aside exemption amounts and bracket effects, the net tax cost is equal to
tA(1 + r)y - t2A(1 + r)Y - tA, in which t is the nominal gift tax rate, A is the amount of the
initial gift, r is the after-tax interest rate, and y is the number of compounding periods.
Simplifying and factoring yields tA((1 - t)(1 + r)Y - 1).
348. This result can be demonstrated algebraically by solving for the equation tA((1 - t)(1
+ r)y - 1) = 0. Simplifying and factoring yields A(1 + r)y = A/(1 - t). The expression on
the left side of the equation represents the formula for determining the future value of the
transferred property drawn back into the transferor's gross estate. The expression on the
right side of the equation represents the formula for determining the grossed up value of the
net gift, where the gift tax is imposed on a tax-exclusive basis.
349. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 423.
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transfer tax system.150 The approach of section 2036(c) is inconsis-
tent with this goal because it imposes a second round of transfer
taxes on transfers that have already been treated as complete for
gift tax purposes.
The broader issue is whether the hard-to-complete rule repre-
sents an unduly harsh remedy for the potential abuses posed by
estate freezes. Generally, a taxpayer is permitted to remove from
his gross estate the future growth of assets transferred by gift dur-
ing his lifetime. The hard-to-complete rule may be criticized for
treating transfers of closely held business interests less favorably
than gifts of other property with comparable appreciation poten-
tial. This adverse treatment also runs contrary to the favorable
treatment generally afforded to family held businesses under the
Code. Although adoption of a unified transfer tax base would
largely eliminate this disparity, pervasive opposition still exists to
unifying the estate and gift tax bases.35'
To the extent that section 2036(c) essentially addresses the
problem of valuation uncertainty, it is necessary to explore the
more limited objective of improving conventional valuation tech-
niques and imposing appropriate sanctions for abuses. One alter-
native would be to require taxpayers to notify the Service of freeze
transactions and to provide for expedited audit at the taxpayer's
request of any gift tax return involving a freeze transaction.3 52
Stricter enforcement of prior law, however, is not an adequate sub-
stitute for section 2036(c). Alternatively, the value of closely held
350. See, e.g., Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Re-
structuring, AB.A_ SEC. TAX'N REP., reprinted in 41 TAX LAW. 395, 404-05 (1988).
351. See id. at 405; see also Aucutt, Further Observations on Transfer Tax Restructur-
ing: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 TAX LAW. 343 (1989); Gutman, A Practitioner's Per-
spective In Perspective: A Reply to Mr. Aucutt, 42 TAX. LAW. 351 (1989). But see Gutman,
supra note 337, at 656-57 (exposing the fallacy of arguments advanced in favor of retaining
tax-exclusive gift tax base).
352. See Moore Statement, supra note 10, at 99-101. Under existing law, it is unclear
whether the Service has authority to correct gift tax valuation errors for estate tax purposes.
Compare Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Mo. 1988)
(no authority to revalue) with Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986) (contrary dictum).
See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-47-005 (July 26, 1984). Because the tentative estate tax would
be offset by any gift tax payable, although not actually paid, on revalued prior gifts, such
revaluation would merely affect the starting point of the graduated estate tax rates. See
I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2504(c); Caron, Revaluation of Prior Gifts for Estate Tax Purposes After
Expiration of Statute of Limitations For Year of Gift, 67 TAxEs 286 (1989).
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stock or a partnership interest might be determined, for gift tax
purposes, under a valuation rule that would maximize the value of
the transferred interest by presuming that retained discretionary
rights would be exercised to enhance the value of the transferred
interest in the hands of family members.35 3 The advantage of such
an approach is that it would directly address the problem of valu-
ing retained discretionary rights that otherwise would artificially
depress the gift tax value of the transferred property in the hands
of related family members. Such a gift tax valuation rule might
enhance revenue in the short term by increasing the gift tax paya-
ble with respect to lifetime transfers. It would further erode the
estate tax, however, unless a contrary estate tax valuation rule
were used to maximize the value of the transferor's retained inter-
est at death. Inconsistent valuation assumptions for gift and estate
tax purposes would merely exacerbate the uncertainty of valuation
determinations and could lead to whipsawing of the government.
Assuming that section 2036(c) is not repealed, it is nevertheless
necessary to redefine what constitutes a disproportionate transfer.
Under the existing statute, the Service apparently views the terms
"appreciation" and "income" as mutually exclusive categories
rather than interrelated components of an overall investment.
Under this view, the value of transferred appreciation can never be
offset by the value of a retained income stream, even if the income
stream represents a fair market rate of return on the retained
property. 354 To the extent that section 2036(c) is directed at valua-
tion problems, however, a fair market rate of return on the re-
tained property should obviate the need for the remedy of section
2036(c) because no disguised transfer of wealth has occurred.
One might argue, however, that section 2036(c) is directed at the
retention of control or beneficial enjoyment of the transferred
property rather than merely at the valuation problem. If this argu-
ment is taken seriously, one can view the transferor as retaining
both the income stream and the potential appreciation, and any
353. See Report of the Section 2036(c) Task Force, supra note 10, at 2-3. The Report also
suggests creation of a safe harbor for certain preferred interests that bear a cumulative divi-
dend or preferred income right at least equal to the liquidation value of such interest multi-
plied by the applicable federal rate under § 1274 and compounded semiannually. Id. at 4-5.
354. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 11, at 9, ex. 13 (preferred stock redeemable at par with
a cumulative dividend preference equivalent to a fair market rate of return).
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appreciation in the value of the transferred property should be in-
cluded in the transferor's gross estate. The argument based on re-
tained control or beneficial enjoyment, however, does not justify
the reinclusion rule of section 2036(c). To the extent that section
2036(c) is triggered merely by the transferor's retention of voting
power or other control over a closely held family business, the stat-
ute seems overly broad; and the reinclusion rule unnecessarily dis-
courages the older generation from transferring a portion of the
business to the younger generation. 55 On the other hand, if the
transferor has not sufficiently relinquished the transferred prop-
erty, a simpler solution would be to hold the entire transaction
open until the transferor's death.
With respect to the valuation problem, it is possible, looking at
events after the date of the transfer, to measure disproportionality
by comparing the yield on the transferred interest with the yield
on the retained interest. Disproportionality is indicated to the ex-
tent that the yield on the transferred interest exceeds the yield on
the retained interest, regardless of whether those yields represent
income, appreciation or a combination of both. A yield-based ap-
proach more accurately reflects economic reality and is less easy to
circumvent than an approach that treats "income" and "apprecia-
tion" as mutually exclusive categories. The artificial distinction be-
tween income and appreciation is likely to encourage the creation
of appreciation rights disguised as income property and income
rights disguised as appreciation property.3 56 A yield-based ap-
proach would also be preferable to existing law because it would
ensure that the value of the control premium is includible in the
transfer tax base. Under existing law, a controlling shareholder can
substantially diminish the value of his shares for transfer tax pur-
poses by fragmenting a controlling block into several minority
blocks and claiming a valuation discount with respect to the sepa-
355. See Report of the Section 2036(c) Task Force, supra note 10, at 2.
356. For example, a "reverse" partnership freeze might be structured to avoid § 2036(c).
The younger generation would receive an "income" interest with a high yield and a liquida-
tion preference. The older generation would receive an "appreciation" interest with a right
to any partnership income and liquidation proceeds remaining after the younger genera-
tion's preferred return. The high return on the younger generation's interest would effec-
tively absorb any potential appreciation in the value of the older generation's interest.
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rate minority blocks. 57 In the past, the Treasury has opposed mi-
nority discounts and proposed that interests held by related indi-
viduals in the same property be aggregated for transfer tax
purposes 5s Although the precise scope of the aggregation rules
may require further elaboration, the present rules governing mi-
nority discounts should be reconsidered. 59
As long as the transferred property is valued consistently, either
as a minority interest or as part of a controlling block, the applica-
ble valuation presumption would not affect the appreciation alloca-
ble to the respective transferred or retained interests under a sec-
tion 704(e) approach.360 If the transferred stock is valued initially
as a minority interest, the control premium will be reflected in a
higher value for the retained interest at death. Conversely, if the
transferred stock is valued initially as part of a majority block for
gift tax purposes, the value of the retained stock at death will be
lower for estate tax purposes. This result is proper to prevent
double inclusion in the transfer tax base of the control premium,
while ensuring that the control premium does not escape transfer
tax due to inconsistent estate and gift tax valuations.3 61
C. Purchases and Partial Consideration
If section 2036(c) were restricted to donative transfers, the ad-
vantages of an estate freeze could nevertheless be accomplished by
structuring the transaction as a sale rather than a gift. A blanket
exemption for any "bona fide sale for adequate and full considera-
357. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright v.
United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Es-
tate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); see also Bogdanski, Minority Dis-
counts: Estate of Bright Meets Judge Posner, 15 J. CORP. TAX'N 280 (1988); Comment, Es-
tate of Bright and Propstra: Rejection of Family Attribution in Estate Valuation, 2 VA.
TAX REv. 357 (1983).
358. See, e.g., 2 TAx REFORM FOR FAiRNESS, SimPLiCrrY AND GROWTH, supra note 336, at
386-88. For an earlier proposal, see Fellows & Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Fed-
eral Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome,
30 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1978).
359. See, e.g., Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, supra note 350, at 421-24.
360. See Fellows & Painter, supra note 358, at 908-10. In enacting the 1987 Act, the
House agreed to abandon provisions concerning minority discounts in exchange for Senate
approval of § 2036(c). See H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10108 (1987); 1987 HousE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 1043-44; Dees, supra note 9, at 876.
361. See Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, supra note 350, at 421, 423.
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tion" would thus resuscitate the abuses section 2036(c) addresses.
Although section 2036(c) presumes conclusively that an intrafamily
sale is not bona fide, it would be preferable to permit the taxpayer
to rebut this presumption by establishing that the sale lacks signif-
icant donative intent and effect. 62 This general rule would permit
the proportionate appreciation in sales to family members to es-
cape section 2036(c) treatment and would focus more explicitly on
the donative intent often present in intrafamily sales. Even if "re-
capture" rules are unavoidable for certain intrafamily sales, careful
attention should be given to the treatment of consideration re-
ceived. A true arm's length sale would not result in any disguised
wealth transfer because the price paid by an unrelated third party
is generally the measure of fair market value. 63 Although sales to
family members should be subject to special scrutiny, the result
should be the same for family members as for unrelated parties if
the purchase price reflects the fair market value of the transferred
property.
The proportional exclusion rule for purchases, adopted by the
1988 Act, is considerably superior to the prior consideration offset
provisions of section 2036(c). Congress might have gone further
and substituted the proportional exclusion rule for the present
rules of section 2043(a) whenever property transferred for less than
adequate and full consideration during life is drawn back into the
transferor's gross estate. Instead, Congress created disparate rules
for determining the consideration offset, depending on whether the
retained interest is drawn back into the gross estate by section
2036(c) or the other retained-interest provisions.
Despite the appeal of administrative simplicity, many view the
present rules of section 2043(a) as conceptually unsound because
they require consideration to be valued at the time of the lifetime
transfer even though the transferred property is included in the
gross estate at its date-of-death value. 64 If the value of the consid-
eration is even slightly less than the value of the property trans-
ferred, measured as of the time of the initial transfer, the rules of
362. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 239.
363. See, e.g., Gutman, supra note 337, at 673.
364. See Lowndes, supra note 30, at 56-57, 82; Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring,
supra note 350, at 410-11.
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section 2043(a) accentuate the discrepancy between present and
future value. For" example, assume that a parent sells property to
his child for $450 when the fair market value of the property is
$500, and the property is worth $1,000 at the parent's death.
Under section 2043(a), the entire $1,000 value is includible in the
parent's gross estate, reduced by a consideration offset of $450. If
the parent had received an additional $50 of consideration, how-
ever, the entire $500 of appreciation would be outside the parent's
gross estate. This arbitrary result could easily be corrected by re-
placing the existing rules of section 2043(a) with the proportional
exclusion rule of section 2036(c) for retained interest transfers
generally.
Unlike the proposed section 704(e) approach, the proportional
exclusion rule of section 2036(c) applies only if the consideration
cannot be traced to the original transferor; if the consideration de-
rives from the transferor, the proportional exclusion rule is inappli-
cable and the appropriate adjustment under section 2036(c) is un-
clear. 65 This tracing rule thus applies most harshly to families
lacking sufficient wealth to provide the younger generation with
adequate "original capital" to qualify for the statutory safe harbor;
the tracing rule, perhaps unintentionally, allows families with more
resources to avoid the harshest results of section 2036(c).36 Viewed
broadly, most wealth owned by the younger generation probably
derives ultimately from inherited family wealth and its attendant
opportunities.
One of the reasons for enacting present section 704(e) in the
family partnership context was precisely to overrule an analogous
judicially developed "original capital" test. 6 As one commentator
has noted, the original capital test "was particularly troubling
since it ignored the principle that income generated from the em-
ployment of capital follows the ownership of capital, and may be
effectively assigned by a gift of the capital."368 In the income tax
context, a transfer may be disregarded as incomplete in order to
ensure that income will be taxed at the transferor's marginal rate.
365. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
367. See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 743-48 (1949); W. MCKEE, supra note
328, 1 14.01[l].
368. W. McKEE, supra note 328, 14.0111].
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By contrast, the original purpose for holding transfers subject to
retained powers open until death for estate tax purposes (before
enactment of the gift tax in 1932) was to prevent such transfers
from escaping transfer tax entirely.36 The retained-interest provi-
sions thus were developed originally to reinforce the estate tax;
they arose "in a context in which there was no gift tax, and contin-
ued in a context in which the gift tax rate was lower than the es-
tate tax rate.'370 To the extent that lifetime transfers are included
in the gift tax base, the original rationale for reincluding retained-
interest transfers in the estate tax base is no longer compelling. 37 1
A better approach would be to permit proportional exclusion for
true gifts as well as purchases and thereby avoid the problems of
ascertaining intent and tracing sources of funds. 7 2
D. Changes in Capital Structure
The application of a proportional exclusion rule is relatively sim-
ple if the transferor originally owns the entire enterprise and the
ratio of donated and retained capital does not change after the
original transfer. The amount includible in the transferor's gross
estate in such a case can be expressed as FVe (1 - PVc/PVe), in
which PV is the present value, determined as of the time of the
initial transfer; FV is the future value, determined as of the date of
the transferor's death; e is the value of the entire enterprise, in-
cluding both the retained and the transferred interests; and c is
the value of the consideration paid by the transferee. The applica-
tion of the proportional exclusion rule quickly becomes more com-
plicated, however, if the ratio of donated to retained capital
changes subsequent to the initial transfer-for example, as a result
of subsequent capital contributions or distributions. The 1988 Act
specifically authorizes the Treasury to promulgate regulations to
369. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 246.
370. Gutman, supra note 337, at 680.
371. If the concern is the lower effective gift tax rate, the obvious solution is to unify the
transfer tax base. If, instead, the concern is the valuation uncertainty, open-transaction
treatment is preferable to reinclusion.
372. A purchaser would be treated as a donee unless the purchase agreement satisfies an
arm's length standard under rules analogous to those of § 704(e). See supra notes 329-30
and accompanying text.
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take into account "extraordinary dividends and other incremental
changes in the capital structure.M7 3
The provision concerning adjustments for changes in capital
structure is intended apparently to complement the Treasury's au-
thority to prescribe regulations preventing avoidance of section
2036(c) "through distributions or otherwise.37 4 The legislative his-
tory suggests that the Treasury may recast distributions to the
transferee as additional taxable gifts, at the time of the distribu-
tion, to prevent the value of the enterprise from being siphoned off
in a series of distributions that would otherwise escape transfer
taxation. 75 Distributions will alter the ratio of the donated and re-
tained capital, as will any failure to pay reasonable compensation
and any additional capital contributions by the transferor or trans-
feree. Unfortunately, the legislative history provides little guidance
concerning such shifts in the ratio of donated and retained capital.
The legislative history does indicate, however, that the Treasury
may adopt "such rules as are appropriate to eliminate the need to
value the entire enterprise in order to make minor adjustments for
consideration received by the transferor. '37 6
Disproportionate distributions to the transferor should reduce
the value of the portion of the enterprise includible in the trans-
feror's gross estate. Such treatment of distributions corresponds to
the underlying economic reality that a return on invested capital
may be reflected as either current income or as unrealized appreci-
ation in asset values. Failure to take distributions into account in
this manner would lead to unwarranted and arbitrary results under
the proportional exclusion rule. For example, assume that a parent
owns all of the common and preferred stock of a corporation, and
sells the common stock to a child for its fair market value of $100
while retaining the preferred stock, also worth $100. If the corpora-
tion has after-tax earnings of 10% and pays annual dividends of
$10 on the preferred stock, the value of the corporation will grow
373. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 76; see also I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5) and
supra text accompanying note 208.
374. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(8); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text.
375. See 1988 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 421.
376. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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to $233.10 at the end of three years.3" If the transferor dies at the
end of Year 3, one half of the value of the enterprise ($116.55)
would be excluded from the transferor's gross estate under the pro-
portional exclusion rule. Assuming that the value of the preferred
stock remains $100 and the value of the common stock grows to
$133.10, it would appear that $16.55 of appreciation-the differ-
ence between the value of the common stock and the amount ex-
cluded under the proportional exclusion rule-has shifted dispro-
portionately to the transferee.
In fact, no value has shifted disproportionately because the ap-
preciation in the value of the common stock ($33.10) exactly equals
the future value of the annual $10 cash flow to the transferor, as-
suming a 10% after-tax return on investments outside the enter-
prise and ignoring the effect of any federal income tax on the dis-
tributions. The proportional exclusion rule thus results in
overinclusion in the transferor's gross estate if the future value of
distributions is ignored. If no distributions occurred, the value of
the enterprise would grow to $266.20, and one half of this amount
($133.10) would be excluded from the transferor's gross estate
under the proportional exclusion rule. The amount includible in
the transferor's gross estate ($133.10) equals the value of the pre-
ferred stock ($100) plus one half of the appreciation in the enter-
prise ($33.10). The aggregate disproportionate shift in value
($33.10) should be properly reincluded in the transferor's gross es-
tate, assuming that no distributions occur.
Similarly, the proportional exclusion rule results in mismeasure-
ment of the value shifted if, for example, a parent sells a remain-
der interest in property worth $100 to a child while retaining a
three-year term interest. Assuming an after-tax yield of 10%, the
remainder interest has a discounted present value of $75.13 and
will grow to $100 at the end of Year 3. If the value of the underly-
ing property remains constant and current income of $10 is paid
annually to the transferor, no disproportionate shift in value will
377. By comparison, assume that $200 is invested in a savings account at the beginning of
Year 1, and $10 is withdrawn on December 31 of each year. The balance in the savings
account at the beginning of Year 2 will be $210 ($220 less $10), which will grow to $231 at
the end of Year 2. After the $10 distribution at the end of Year 2, the remaining balance of
$221 ($231 less $10) will grow to $243.10, leaving $233.10 ($243.10 less $10) after the distri-
bution at the end of Year 3.
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occur. The appreciation in the value of the remainder interest
($24.87) is equal to the present value of the future income stream
retained by the transferor ($33.10), discounted at a 10% after-tax
rate.3 8 Under the proportional exclusion rule, however, only a por-
tion of the underlying property apparently would be excluded from
the transferor's gross estate. If the consideration paid is measured
against the present value of the entire property, the exclusion ratio
would be approximately 75% ($75.13/$100), leaving an additional
amount ($24.87) includible in the transferor's gross estate. 9 If the
consideration paid is measured against the present value of the re-
mainder interest only, the exclusion ratio would be 100%.
The proportional exclusion rule must be refined to take into ac-
count distributions and other events that occur after the initial
transfer to avoid mismeasurement of the disproportionate shift in
value. One way to take such events into account without having to
revalue the enterprise on each event would be to adopt a yield-
based approach to incremental changes in capital structure that
shift the relative values of the transferred and retained interests.
Under a yield-based approach, contributions and distributions
would be treated as altering the proportionate interests of the
transferor and transferee, represented by their initial capital ac-
counts in the enterprise.
The accompanying charts illustrate the shift in values over a
five-year period with respect to an enterprise consisting initially of
$100 of preferred stock and $100 of common stock, assuming an
after-tax annual yield of 15% for the enterprise as a whole. In
Chart I, the only cash flow consists of dividends of $10 paid each
year on the preferred stock; no additional contributions or distri-
butions occur. Chart II is identical to Chart I except that it illus-
trates two additional cash flows: First, the common stockholder
makes a capital contribution of $25 in Year 2 and, second, an ex-
378. The deferral of the income tax liability on the accrued appreciation in the value of
the remainder interest is the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government to the
taxpayer equal to the deferred tax liability. Neutral treatment of unrealized gains under the
income tax would require accrual-basis taxation, or imposition of an appropriate interest
charge for the deferral benefit. See, e.g., Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and the Neutral Taxa-
tion of Capital Gains, 26 NAT. TAX J. 565 (1973). See generally Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PENN. L. REv. 1111 (1986).
379. See supra note 292.
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traordinary dividend of $50 is paid on the common stock in Year 3.
The cumulative capital accounts (inside values) represent the cu-
mulative values of the initial capital accounts ($100 for the pre-
ferred and common stock, respectively), adjusted for subsequent
contributions and distributions that are assumed to occur at year
end. The cumulative value of the distributions on the preferred
and common stock (outside values) represent the values of the
cash flows compounded at the applicable yield.380 Assuming that
all growth in the enterprise is shared ratably, the cumulative inside
value of the preferred stockholder's capital account would grow to
$133.71 in each case. If the preferred stock is actually valued at
$100 at the end of Year 5, $33.71 of appreciation-the difference
between the preferred stockholder's ending capital account of
$133.71 and the preferred stock's actual value of $100-has shifted
disproportionately to the common stock. The additional $33.71 of
appreciation is also equal to the excess of the fair market value of
the common stock ($234.85) over the value of the common stock-
holder's ending capital account ($201.14). See Chart I. Because the
yield-based approach treats contributions and distributions neu-
trally, the amount of the disproportionate shift in value ($33.71) is
not affected by the net additional cash flows that reduce both the
fair market value of the common stock ($206.74) and the common
stockholder's ending capital account ($173.03). See Chart II.
380. The applicable yield (or internal rate of return) is the annual yield (15%) that, when
applied to all cash flows, produces a total present value equal to the present value of the
initial capital accounts increased by the discounted present value of all additional capital
contributions and reduced by the discounted present value of all distributions.
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One might object that the yield-based approach is unrealistic if
the transferor is unable to reinvest distributions on the preferred
stock at the internal rate of return. If the after-tax yield on distri-
butions is less than the internal rate of return, the value of the
property actually owned by the transferor will be less than the im-
puted value under the yield-based approach. Modifying the yield-
based approach to reflect alternative assumptions concerning the
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after-tax yield on distributions, however, would entail additional
complexity. Moreover, the tendency of closely held family busi-
nesses to retain assets for future growth means that distributions
are likely to represent a relatively insignificant portion of the en-
tire value of the enterprise. The incentive to retain earnings rather
than make distributions would be correspondingly greater when-
ever the after-tax yield on distributions is significantly less than
the internal rate of return.
In theory, amounts includible in the transferor's gross estate
should be reduced for any built-in federal income tax liability."' s
For example, the compounded value of distributions taxable as
dividends might be reduced by 30% to reflect the federal income
tax liability. Adjusting for the federal income tax liability, how-
ever, would distort the comparison between retained earnings and
distributions. Any earnings retained in the enterprise are likely to
be taxed at equivalent rates upon distribution or liquidation. 2
The yield-based approach avoids the difficulty under present
section 2036(c) of determining whether distributions with respect
to the transferred interest should be treated as additional taxable
gifts at the time of each distribution. As long as cumulative inside
values are adjusted to reflect contributions and distributions, and
all cash flows are discounted at a uniform rate of return, any dis-
proportionate capital shift can be ascertained readily by comparing
fair market values with ending capital accounts. No additional gift
tax need be imposed at the time of distributions. Instead, the taxa-
ble event can be postponed until the difference between fair mar-
ket value and ending capital accounts is determined. Because dis-
tributions with respect to the transferred interest may represent
merely a return on the transferee's initial capital account, or addi-
tional capital contributions, deferral of the taxable event avoids
the need for retroactive adjustments.
A subsequent disposition of the retained or transferred interest
is essentially equivalent to a deemed distribution that alters the
proportionate interests of the original transferor and transferee.
381. See, e.g., Dodge, Retentions, Receipts, Transfers, and Accumulations of Income and
Income Rights, Ruminations on the Post-Byrum Role of Estate Tax Sections 2036, 2037,
2039, and 2043(a), 58 Tsx. L. REv. 1, 58 (1979).
382. Even if the nominal rates are equivalent, however, postponement of the shareholder
level tax on retained earnings represents a deferral benefit. See supra note 378.
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Any capital shift occurring prior to the disposition will be reflected
in the original transferor's or transferee's ending capital account
balance. A disposition that completely terminates the original
transferor's or transferee's interest should trigger immediate taxa-
tion of the aggregate capital shift because further deferral serves
no useful purpose. If the disposition produces only a partial termi-
nation, however, the entire transaction should be held open to
avoid interim valuations. The capital account balances should be
restated immediately after each disposition to reflect the alteration
in the original transferor's and transferee's respective interests.
The original transferor's and transferee's capital accounts should
be increased by the fair market value of any additional interest
acquired and reduced by the fair market value of any interest dis-
posed of. Restatement of the capital accounts would ensure that
any subsequent appreciation in the enterprise would be allocated
in proportion to the original transferor's and transferee's respective
capital accounts.
If a disposition completely restores proportionality between the
retained and transferred interests, closing the transaction with re-
spect to all prior capital shifts seems appropriate. The restoration
of proportionality safeguards against subsequent capital shifts for
the benefit of the original transferee and should be treated as a
complete termination of the retained and transferred interests. If
the disposition fails to restore complete proportionality, however,
it seems appropriate to hold the transaction open.
CONCLUSION
Perceived originally as a relatively obscure technical measure,
section 2036(c) has come to occupy a central role in the transfer
tax system. Indeed, section 2036(c) embodies a unique statutory
scheme that threatens to engulf the general pattern of taxing re-
tained-interest transfers. The extent of abusive estate freezing
techniques prior to enactment of the statute is necessarily conjec-
tural. The vehement opposition to this measure, however, suggests
that such abuses were sufficiently widespread to justify drastic
measures. In retrospect, many business clients and estate planners
clearly had come to view estate freezing transactions as a generally
acceptable and routine technique for minimizing transfer taxes.
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Concerted efforts to repeal section 2036(c) have centered on the
perception that the statute is an "anti-family business" measure.3 83
The opponents of section 2036(c) have argued strenuously that the
complexity, breadth and vagueness of the statute pose an unrea-
sonable impediment to the transfer of closely held businesses. The
technical problems encountered in implementing the existing stat-
ute, however, must be weighed against the costs of outright repeal.
If efforts to repeal the statute are successful, taxpayers might take
full advantage of the opportunity to implement abusive estate
freezes with impunity. By the same token, the Service might chal-
lenge such transactions on the basis of principles independent of
section 2036(c), but hardly more settled in scope or application,
leading to expensive and wasteful litigation. Moreover, the repeal
of section 2036(c) without a substitute provision would produce an
immediate and permanent revenue loss.
Although the arguments for repeal exaggerate the potential im-
pact of section 2036(c) on "legitimate" intrafamily transfers (if not
on the business of planning estate freezes), the technical problems
with the existing statute become apparent quickly in even the most
simple situations. One commentator has suggested that the sweep-
ing, open ended tenor of section 2036(c) is defensible on the prag-
matic ground that it has a salutory "in terrorem" effect.38 4 Accord-
ing to this argument, a clear understanding of the operation and
purpose of the statute is unnecessary to accomplish its congres-
sional purpose. Aggressive planning will be deterred even if, or pre-
cisely because, "no one is sure whether, or how, it works in all par-
ticulars. 3 85 Indeed, the Service's long-awaited guidance concerning
estate freezes discusses various statutory exceptions with specific-
ity and detail, but leaves the statute's operative provisions open to
speculation.
383. For various bills introduced to repeal § 2036(c), see JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 101ST
CONG., IST SEss., DESCRIPTION OF TAX BILLS: S. 353 (EDUCATIONAL SAVINGS BONDS); S. 442
(VALUE ADDED TAX); S. 659, S. 838, S. 849 (ESTATE FREEZES); S.800 (MORATORIUM ON CERTAIN
STATE TAX LAWS) (May 11, 1989). See S. 1750, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 6691 (1989) (repeal
of §§ 2036(c) and 2207B); Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at G-6 (Oct. 16, 1989) (Senate
floor vote deleting repeal provisions and other revenue-losing measures).
384. Bogdanski & Brown, supra note 9, at 1652.
385. Id. at 1651.
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VALUATION FREEZES AFTER THE 1988 ACT
This Article rejects the arguments for both outright repeal and
critical acceptance of the existing statute. As a policy matter, the
viability of section 2036(c) is linked inextricably to its technical
realization. The Article suggests that full unification of the gift and
estate tax base would make it possible, in most instances, to dis-
pense with the retained-interest provisions. If Congress is unwill-
ing to implement a fully unified transfer tax base, however, an-
other means to ensure as much consistency as possible between
section 2036(c) and other transfer tax provisions is essential. Sub-
stitution of a proportional exclusion rule in lieu of the considera-
tion offset rule of section 2043 for retained-interest transfers gen-
erally would represent a modest step in this direction. Finally, the
Article has developed a yield-based approach that makes possible
less arbitrary and more accurate measurements of shifts in value
than does the inclusion of "appreciation" property under section
2036(c) in its present form.
Although the underlying concept of section 2036(c) is decep-
tively simple, the complexity of the existing statute provides a val-
uable lesson concerning technical implementation of tax reform.
Clearly, Congress may appropriately enact statutes that set forth
general rules in terms broad enough to permit elaboration through
detailed regulations and administrative interpretation. The stat-
ute, however, must be sufficiently precise to indicate a coherent
legislative intent. Section 2036(c) illustrates the dangers of intro-
ducing hastily considered and clumsily drafted amendments into
an intricate statutory framework. If section 2036(c) proves ulti-
mately unworkable, perhaps Congress will undertake a more ra-
tional and thorough reexamination of the transfer tax system.
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